董監事暨重要職員責任保險的公司治理角色
實證研究-以台灣上市上櫃電子業為例

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：22

、訪客IP：18.219.75.202

姓名

盧榮和(Jung-Ho Lu) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

董監事暨重要職員責任保險的公司治理角色實證研究-以台灣上市上櫃電子業為例
(The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance in Corporate Governance–An Empirical Study on Electronic Industry in Taiwan )

相關論文

★ 台灣企業經營模式研究-以個案公司為例	★ 組織文化對企業永續經營之影響---以某外商為例之個案研究
★ 專案管理運用於軍售作業之探討	★ 合資企業組織變革與組織學習對組織績效之影響 ---以國內某合資氣體公司為例
★ 探討在分散型產業,如何利用策略性委外執行低成本與差異化-以Supermicro公司為例	★ 企業投資中國的成長策略之探討-以台灣艾華電子公司為例
★ 從全球定位系統(GPS)設計代工個案探討其競爭優勢	★ 創投公司投資網際網路產業之先佔者優勢探討
★ 以資料包絡分析法評估電資通光領域之科技研究發展專案計畫相對效率	★ 車廠中頻直流（MFDC）點焊之品質管理制度的建立 — 以C公司為例
★ 運用六個標準差降低液晶製程中半成品耗損 — 以A公司為例	★ 以財務指標探討連接器產業之經營策略-以A公司為例
★ 台灣半導體通路商經營績效分析之研究-以資料包絡分析法評估	★ 自行車安全帽行業自創品牌進入中國市場之行銷策略－以廠商F公司為例
★ 化粧品零售業之電子商務商業模式-以S企業集團直營網站經營為例	★ 台灣網版印刷中小企業競爭策略分析-以E公司為例

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

Holderness (1990) 認為，就公開上市公司而言，「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」(Director’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance)在公司治理上扮演一個重要的角色。O’Sullivan (1997) 則就Holderness的假說做實證，其結果大致支持Holderness 的監督(Monitoring)假說。本論文則就2004年國內619家上市上櫃電子公司為樣本，藉檢視存在於「董事會組成」(board composition)、「管理人股權」(managerial ownership)與「外部股東控制」(external shareholder control)之相關性，以探求董監事暨重要職員責任保險在公司治理上所扮演的角色。
儘管本文實證結果僅部分支持前述監督假說，然本研究不僅可視為國內首開研究D&O責任保險的公司治理角色之議題，本研究結果也提供進一步深入探討台灣上市上櫃電子業對D&O責任保險的需求。

摘要(英)

Holderness (1990) suggests that director’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance has an important governance role in publicly owned companies. O’Sullivan (1997) empirically tests Holderness’s monitoring hypothesis, the results generally support the monitoring hypothesis. By examining the association between board composition, managerial ownership, external shareholder control, and the purchase of D&O insurance, this paper examines the role of Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance in corporate governance of 619 TSE-Listed and Over-the-Counter Listed (OTC-Listed) electronic companies in Taiwan. Although the results merely partly support the monitoring hypothesis, this study not only can be considered an important first step in attempting to understand the governance role of D&O insurance but also provide some further insights on the demand for D&O insurance in Taiwan.

關鍵字(中)

關鍵字(英)

★ Outside Director
★ Corporate Governance
★ Inside Director
★ Monitoring
★ D&
★ O insurance

論文目次

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I
論文摘要 III
ABSTRACT IV
LIST OF FIGURES VII
LIST OF TABLES VIII
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background and Motivation of Research 1
1.2 The Issues and Purposes of Research 2
1.3 The Framework and Process of Research 4
1.4 Organization of the Research 6
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MONITORING HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 7
2.1. Framework of Corporate Governance in Taiwan 7
2.1.1 The Basic Legal Framework of Corporate Governance Practices in Taiwan 8
2.1.2 Major Directions for Corporate Governance System in Taiwan 10
2.2 Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Insurance Practice 12
2.2.1 Director Liability 12
2.2.2 The impact of Shareholder Lawsuits 14
2.2.3 Indemnification 15
2.2.4 Coverage of D&O Liability Insurance 16
2.2.5 The Incentive Effects and Impact of D&O Insurance 19
2.2.6 Monitoring with D&O Liability Insurance 22
2.3 The Monitoring Hypothesis 24
2.3.1 Board Composition 25
2.3.2 Leadership 27
2.3.3 Ownership Structure 27
2.3.4 The Effects of Firm Size 31
2.3.5 D&O Liability Insurance vs. Alternative Mechanisms 32
2.3.6 The Hypotheses Establishment 33
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 35
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 35
3.2 Analytic Methods 36
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 36
3.2.2 Correlation Analysis 36
3.2.3 Test of Independence 36
3.2.4 Logistic Regression Analysis 36
3.3 Variable Description 37
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 37
3.3.2 Independent Variables 37
CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 41
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 49
5.1 Conclusions 49
5.2 Implications 50
5.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 51
5.4 Suggestions for the Authority 52
REFERENCES 54
APPENDIX-Quantitative Data 60

參考文獻

1. Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber, 1996, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31: 377-397.
2. American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws, 1978, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Business Lawyer, 33:1595-1644.
3. Baysinger, B. D. and R. E. Hoskisson, 1990, The Composition of Board of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, Academy of Management Review, 15:72-87.
4. Beatty, R. P. and E. J. Zajac, 1994, Top Management Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Sharing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39:313-336.
5. Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan).
6. Bhagat, S., J. A. Brickley, and J. L. Coles, 1987, Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: the Effect on Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 55:721-736.
7. Black, B., B. Cheffins and M. Klausner, 2005, Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross-Border Analysis, European Financial Management, 11:153-171.
8. Block, D. J. and Y. Miller, 1983, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, Securities Regulation Law Journal, 11:44-72.
9. Brickley, J. A. and C. L. James, 1987, The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking, Journal of Law and Economics, 30:161-180.
10. Brook, Y. and K. S. Rao, 1994, Shareholder Wealth Effects of Directors’ Liability Limitation Provisions, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29:481-497.
11. Cadbury, A., 1992, Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: GEC).
12. Cassidy, Dan, 1989, Liability Exposures, London: Witherby & Co. Ltd. 149-151.
13. Chalmers, J. M. R., L. Y. Dann and J. Harford, 2002, Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, Journal of Finance, 57: 609-636.
14. Cieri, R. M. and M. J. Riela, 2004, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corporations that are Insolvent or in the Zone or Vicinity of Insolvency, DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 2: 295-340.
15. Core, John E., 1997, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64: 63-87.
16. ___________, 2000, The Directors' and Officers' Insurance Premium: an Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 16: 449-477.
17. Cross, Mark L., W. N. Davidson and J. H. Thornton, 1989, The Impact of Directors and Officers' Liability Suits on Firm Value, Journal of Risk & Insurance, 56: 128-136.
18. Daniels, R. J. and S. M. Hutton, 1993, The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of the Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance, Canadian Business Law Journal, 22: 182-230.
19. Davis, G. F., 1991, Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36:583-613.
20. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, 1985, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93:1155-1177.
21. Derrington, D.K. and R. S. Ashton, 1990, The Law of liability Insurance, Australia: Butterworths Pty Limites.
22. Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review, 14:57-74.
23. Fama, E. F., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288-307.
24. Fama, E. F. and M. Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-325.
25. Finkelstein, S. and D. C. Hambrick, 1988, Chief Executive Compensation: A Synthesis and Reconciliation, Strategic Management Journal, 9:543-558.
26. Fisher, J. and J. Bewsey, 1997, The Law of Investor Protection, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.
27. Flanigan, George B., 2002, A Perspective on General Liability Insurance and the Pollution Hazard: Exposures and Contracts. Journal of Insurance Regulation, 20(3): 296-337.
28. Fredrickson, J. W., D. C. Hambrick and S. Baumrin, 1988, A Model of CEO Dismissal, Academy of Management Review, 13:255-270.
29. Gillan, S. L. and L. T. Starks, 1998, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence, Contemporary Finance Digest, 2(3): 10-34.
30. _______ and _______, 2000, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investor, Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2): 275-305.
31. _______ and _______, 2003, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investor: A Global Perspective, Journal of Applied Finance, 13:4-22.
32. Goldschmid, Harvey J., 1998, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, Journal of Corporation Law, 21: 631-653.
33. Hagglund, C. E. J.D., B. D. Weimer, J.D. and J. P. Monteleone, Esq., 1999, Directors & Officers liability Guide to Risk Exposures and Coverage. Ohio: The National Underwriter Company.
34. Hart, O. D., 1983, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, Bell Journal of Economics, 14: 366-382.
35. Holderness, C. G., 1990, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, International Review of Law and Economics, 10: 115-129.
36. Huddart, S., 1993, The Effort of A Large Shareholder on Corporate Value, Management Science, 39:1407-1421.
37. Huebner, S.S., K. Black, Jr. and B. L. Webb, 1996, Property and Liability Insurance, 4th Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 418-419.
38. Huebner, S.S., K. Black, Jr. and R. S. Cline, 1982, Property and Liability Insurance, 3rd Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
39. Ingley, C. B. and N. T. Van Der Walt, 2004, Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest, Corporate Governance: an International Review, 12:534-551.
40. Janjigian, V. and P. J. Bolster, 1990, The Elimination of Director Liability and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial Research, 13: 53-60.
41. Jensen, M. C., 1993, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Financial, 48: 831-880.
42. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
43. Jones, T. M., 1981, Shareholder Suits: Good News and Bad News for Corporate Executives, California Management Review, 23:77-86.
44. Kaplan, M. R. and J. R. Harrison, 1993, Defusing the Director Liability Crisis: the Strategic Management of Legal Threats, Organization Science, 4:412-432.
45. Kerr, J. and L. Kren, 1992, Effect of Relative Decision Monitoring on Chief Executive Compensation, Academy of Management Journal, 35:370-397.
46. Kesner, I. F. and R. B. Johnson, 1990, Boardroom Crisis: Fiction or Fact, Academy of Management Executive, 4:23-35.
47. Kinnear, James W., 2002, Corporate Governance: a System for Accountability, Directorship, 28: 9-16.
48. Lorsch, J. W. and E. Maciver, 1989, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
49. Malecki, D. S., R. C. Horn, E. A. Wiening, and A. L. Flitner, 1995, Commercial Liability Insurance and Risk Management, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, Pennsylvania, American Institute for CPCU.
50. ______, _______, ______, and ______, 1996, Commercial Liability Insurance and Risk Management, Volume 2, 3rd Edition, Pennsylvania, American Institute for CPCU, 77-93.
51. Manne, H. G., 1965, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 73:110-120.
52. Marris, R. L., 1964, The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, Macmillan, London.
53. Maug, Ernst, 1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-off between Liquidity and Control? Journal of Finance, 53: 65-98.
54. Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith, Jr., 1982, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Business, 55: 281-296.
55. _______ and ______, 1987, Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment Problem, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54: 45-54.
56. _______ and _______, 1990, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Reinsurance Market, Journal of Business, 63: 19-40.
57. Miyajima, H., Y. Arikawa and A. Kato, 2002, Corporate Governance, Relational Banking and R&D: Evidence from Japanese Large Firms in the 1980s and1990s, International Journal of Technology Management, 23: 769-787.
58. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293-315.
59. Nonprofit Business Advisor, 2002, Examining Directors and Officers Liability Insurance. Nonprofit Business Advisor, 5(156): 12-13.
60. O'Sullivan, Noel, 1997, Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate Governance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64:545-556.
61. _____________, 2002, The Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance by Large U.K. Companies, European Management Journal, 20: 574-583.
62. Parry, M. E. and A. E. Parry, 1991, The Purchase of Insurance by a Risk- Neutral Firm for a Risk-Averse Agent, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58: 31-46.
63. Rediker, K. J. and A. Seth, 1995, Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of Alternative Governance Mechanisms, Strategic Management Journal, 16: 85-99.
64. Rejda, George E., 2005, Principles of Risk management and Insurance, 9th Edition, Addison Wesley.
65. Rosenstein, Stuart and J. G. Wyatt, 1997, Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, 44:229-250.
66. Schellenger, M. H., D. D. Wood and A. Tashakori, 1989, Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and Dividend Policy, Journal of Management, 15:457-467.
67. Schaeftler, Michael A., 1976 The Liabilities of Office: Indemnification and Insurance of Officers and Directors, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
68. Schleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461-488.
69. Securities and Futures Institute (SFI), April, 2005, Corporate Governance in Taiwan, (Taipei: Securities and Futures Institute).
70. Wade, J. B., C. A. O’Reilly and I. Chandratat, 1990, Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35:587-603.
71. Weisbach, Michael S, 1988, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 20:431-460.
72. Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 1999, An Empirical Investigation of the Japanese Corporate Demand for Insurance, Journal of Risk & Insurance, 66: 239-252.
73. Young, Steven, 2000, The Increasing Use of Non-Executive Directors: Its Impact on U.K. Board Structure and Governance Arrangements, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27:1311-1342.
74. Youngman, I., 1999, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Woodhead Publishing Ltd., Cambridge, England.
75. Zajac, E. J. and J. D. Westphal, 1994, The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better？Strategic Management Journal, 15:121-142.
76. Zulkey, Edward J., 1995-1997, Business Liability Insurance: Litigation, Arbitration and Settlement, Butterworth Legal Publishers.
77. TSE Website, 2005: http://www.tse.com.tw

指導教授

洪德俊(Der-Juinn Horng)

審核日期

2006-3-30

推文