| 摘要(英) |
The phenomenon of abnormal positive stock return during initial public offering(IPO) has been supported by tests no matter in Taiwan’s or other country’s stock market. In recent years, there were a lot of scholars explaining this phenomenon by the view of monitoring hypothesis. Among them, the argument of Stoughton and Zechner(1998) was in the contrast of that of Brennan and Franks(1997). Brennan and Franks(1997) argue that firm’s management underprices new share to create excess demand and reduce the probability of being supervised by blockholders. In contrast to Brennan and Franks(1997), Stoughton and Zechner(1998) argue the management want blockholders in order to provide their monitoring services. This research considers the actual condition of Taiwan’s stock market, collects 214 samples which necessary data was available from 1995 to 2004 from database of the listed company. The conclusion of this research is as follows:
1. Relation between stock concentration at the IPO and the degree of underpricng: there is no apparent relation between whether there was blockholders at IPO and whether firms underpriced the offer price. On the other side, the stock concentration at the IPO of firms the underpriced are slightly lower the those of firms the not underpriced, but only some indexes reach the significant level. As to results of multiregression analysis, there is negative relation between stock concentration at the IPO and the degree of underpricng, but only some indexes reach the significant level. Accordingly, this research concludes that there is only weak relation between stock concentration at the IPO and the degree of underpricng.
2. Relation between the degree of underpricng and stock concentration after the IPO and: there is no apparent relation between whether whether firms underpriced the offer price and whether there was blockholders after the IPO. On the other side, the stock concentration after the IPO of firms the underpriced are slightly lower the those of firms the not underpriced, but only some indexes reach the significant level. As to results of multiregression analysis, there is no relation between the degree of underpricng and stock concentration after the IPO. Accordingly, this research concludes that there is no relation between the degree of underpricng and stock concentration after the IPO. If the relation exists, it appears to be supportive of Brennan and Franks(1997).
3. This research verifies three definition of initial return and conclude that there is no apparent influence of different definition on the result of tests. But one of the definition-MAIRa is not robust compared with other definitions. |
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