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姓名 許珮蓉(Pei Jung)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系
論文名稱 從企業型態探討創新活動行為─以家族與集團企業為例
(The impcat of R&D activity on business category-take family firms and business group for example)
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摘要(中) 創新活動因資訊不對稱性高、風險性大,多仰賴企業內部資金進行投資。由於台灣屬於新興經濟體系國家的一份子,相較於已開發國家,市場機制不健全,法規制度薄弱,致使企業在發展創新活動的同時會受到資金上的限制,則本研究凸顯集團和家族這兩種不同的企業型態對於創新活動的差異性,集團企業可降低創新活動對於現金流量的敏感度,而家族企業則會仰賴內部資金從事創新活動,尤其在財務限制下,此關係更為顯著。
摘要(英) Firms are so difficult to finance in the capital markets that they usually rely on internal funds to invest R&D projects, which often consist of high information asymmetry and high risk. Both business group and family firms have competitive advantage in capital markets, and therefore, this study investigates how the business groups and family firms in Taiwan influence R&D activities. The results support the hypothesis that contrary to family firms, business groups can mitigate the dependence on the cash flow when financing R&D investment. Moreover, this phenomenon is more obvious under the financially constrained business groups and family firms.
關鍵字(中) ★ 集團企業
★ 家族企業
★ 創新活動
關鍵字(英) ★ R&
★ D investment
★ Family Firms
★ Business group
論文目次 論文摘要.....................................................................................................................I
英文摘要....................................................................................................................II
壹、 緒論.............................................................................................................1
貳、 文獻探討與假說推導.................................................................................4
一、 集團企業和創新活動的關係..............................................................5
二、 家族企業和創新活動的關係..............................................................8
參、 研究設計...................................................................................................11
一、 樣本篩選............................................................................................11
二、 樣本分類............................................................................................12
三、 實證模型............................................................................................15
肆、 實證結果與分析.......................................................................................19
一、 樣本敘述統計....................................................................................19
二、 基本實證結果....................................................................................21
三、 穩健性測試........................................................................................24
伍、 結論...........................................................................................................32
陸、 參考文獻...................................................................................................34
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指導教授 洪榮華、郭逸真(Jung-Hua Hung) 審核日期 2007-6-28
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