以代理理論探討家族與非家族公司在資本結構決策上之差異

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姓名

謝可杉(Ko-shan Hsieh) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

以代理理論探討家族與非家族公司在資本結構決策上之差異
(The Difference of Capital Structure Decision between Family Firms and Non-family Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective)

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摘要(中)

本文從代理問題的角度，檢視隸屬股東保護程度低的新興市場中的臺灣，家族公司的特性是否造成家族公司和非家族公司的資本結構決策有差異。並檢視家族公司的內部監理制度是否能有效運作。以上市與上櫃公司為對象，資料從2000年到2005年，透過聯立模型以3SLS實證發現：（1）家族公司槓桿水準高於非家族公司，符合利益輸送與公司竊取理論；（2）家族樣本中，外部股東和外部董事皆顯著為負，表示若這些內部的監督機制有效運作，可對家族公司產生約束力；（3）股利與負債政策間互呈顯著正相關，表示不再符合過去傳統代理問題主張的兩者間存在替代的監督機制關係，而是符合財富剝削假說（Wealth expropriate hypothesis）。

摘要(英)

The purposes of this paper are to examine how the family firms in Taiwan influence capital structure under their specific characteristic and how effective the internal governance systems work in the family firms. We collected data from listed and over the counter firms between 2000 and 2005. The 3SLS results support hypothesis that family firms have higher leverage than non-family firms and the internal governance systems work well inside family firm. It also finds the dividend is positive to leverage. It implies that it was consistent with the wealth expropriation hypothesis.

關鍵字(中)

★ 代理問題
★ 資本結構
★ 家族公司
★ 槓桿

關鍵字(英)

★ Leverage
★ Family firms
★ Capital Structure
★ Agency Problems

論文目次

中文摘要 …………………………………………………………………… i
英文摘要 …………………………………………………………………… ii
誌謝 …………………………………………………………………… iii
目錄 …………………………………………………………………… iv
表目錄 …………………………………………………………………… v
一、緒論……………………………………………………………… 1
二、文獻探討與研究假說…………………………………………… 3
三、研究設計………………………………………………………… 7
3.1 選樣準則與資料來源…………………………………………… 7
3.2 實證模式………………………………………………………… 8
四、實證結果與分析………………………………………………… 11
4.1 基本敘述性分析………………………………………………… 11
4.2 相關與迴歸分析………………………………………………… 12
4.3 穩健性檢定……………………………………………………… 18
五、結論……………………………………………………………… 20
參考文獻 …………………………………………………………………… 22

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-hua Hung)

審核日期

2007-6-25

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