從家族企業探討創新活動行為

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姓名

黃茵妤(Yin-yu Huang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

從家族企業探討創新活動行為
(Founding family ownership and innovation:An empirical analysis from Taiwan)

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至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

本文探討家族企業與創新活動的關聯性。實證結果發現，相較於非家族企業，家族企業較會進行創新活動。此一實證結果顯示，家族企業可以有效降低創新活動所帶來的代理問題。

摘要(英)

This study investigates the relation between founding-family ownership and inventive activity. We find that family firms are more innovative than nonfamily firms. Our empirical results are consistent with the conjecture that family ownership is effective at alleviating the high agency costs associated innovation.

關鍵字(中)

★ 創新活動
★ 家族企業

關鍵字(英)

★ innovation
★ family firms

論文目次

中文摘要..................................................i
英文摘要.................................................ii
目錄....................................................iii
表目錄...................................................iv
一、緒論.............................................1
二、文獻探討.........................................4
2.1. 家族企業議題.....................................4
2.2. 股權結構與創新活動...............................5
三、假說發展.........................................7
3.1. 家族企業與代理問題...............................7
3.1.1. 型I代理問題......................................7
3.1.2. 型II代理問題.....................................8
3.2. 家族企業與創新活動...............................8
四、研究方法........................................11
4.1. 選樣準則與資料來源..............................11
4.2. 實證模式與變數定義..............................13
4.2.1. 創新活動之衡量..................................13
4.2.2 家族企業之定義與分類............................14
4.2.3. 模式............................................14
五、實證結果與分析..................................17
5.1. 樣本敘述統計....................................17
5.2. 基本實證結果....................................20
5.3. 家族企業－家族成員擔任CEO之影響.................21
5.4. 家族企業－採取擴增控制權機制之影響..............23
5.5. 家族企業－公司年齡之影響........................24
5.6. 創新活動與家族所有權之非線性關係................26
六、結論............................................28
參考文獻 ................................................30

參考文獻

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指導教授

曹壽民(Shou-min Tsao)

審核日期

2008-7-2

推文