家族企業對自願性盈餘預測之影響

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姓名

賴玫帆(Mei-fan Lai) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

家族企業對自願性盈餘預測之影響
(The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Quality between Family Firms and Non-family Firms)

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摘要(中)

相對於非家族企業，家族企業面對較不嚴重的所有權和管理權分離之代理問題，然而面對較嚴重的大小股東間之代理問題。針對台灣上市櫃公司進行研究發現，家族企業對自願性盈餘預測意願較低、發布盈餘預測次數較少，且發布的盈餘品質較好，此和家族企業通常有較長遠的投資、管理監督較好及與經理人間的資訊不對稱程度較低所導致的結果一致。進一步就家族擔任高管理階層人員而言，其實證結果相同。

摘要(英)

Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. We collected data from listed and over the counter firms, and show that family firms provide less voluntary disclosure, forecast less frequently, report better quality earnings. The result is consistent with family owners having longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers. Using alternative proxies for family presence (family members being CEO) leads to similar results.

關鍵字(中)

★ 財測偏差
★ 家族企業
★ 代理問題
★ 盈餘品質
★ 自願性財務預測

關鍵字(英)

★ earnings quality
★ forecast errors
★ agency problem
★ family firms
★ voluntary management forecasts

論文目次

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻探討 2
2.1 財務預測規範的制度背景 2
2.2 股權結構對揭露的文獻 3
參、假說發展 4
3.1 家族企業對自願性揭露的影響 4
3.2 代理問題與自願性揭露之品質 5
3.3 迴歸模式 6
3.4 樣本選取、研究期間與資料來源 9
肆、實證結果與分析 11
4.1 敘述性統計量與相關分析 11
4.2 家族對揭露與發布次數的影響 18
4.3 家族對揭露盈餘預測品質的影響 20
4.4 家族CEO與擴增控制機制之影響 21
4.5 Heckman兩階段迴歸估計 26
伍、結論 28
參考文獻 30

參考文獻

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指導教授

曹壽民(S. M. Tsao)

審核日期

2008-7-8

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