從代理理論觀點探討家族企業之股票買回行為

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許凱婷(Kai-Ting Hsu) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系

論文名稱

從代理理論觀點探討家族企業之股票買回行為
(Agency Theory and The Repurchase Behaviors of Family Business)

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摘要(中)

本研究以2001至2006年間台灣上市、上櫃公司為樣本，探討家族企業特性、家族成員隸屬以及外部治理機制對企業之股票買回政策之影響。本研究加入家族因素，探討家族企業在控制權與所有權分離的情況下，其股票買回的可能性，利用邏輯迴歸(Logit
regression )分析方法；結果發現，家族企業越不會進行股票買回，偏離程度與股票買回呈現倒U型關係，當存在家族CEO時，企業經營者會利用股票買回政策可改變股權結構的特性，增加手中之持股權；另外當企業存在家族CEO且偏離程度越高時，越不會進行股票買回；當企業之董事長兼任CEO時，亦會利用股票買回政策增加對企業之控制權，並且直到偏離程度高達可以足夠掌控經營決策時，會降低股票買回政策的執行。在外部治理機制方面，家族企業之外部董事能發揮監督公司之效，而非家族企業則相反；企業與第二大股東則可能存在利益關係，尤其是非家族企業；機構投資人於家族企業中無法發揮監督之效。

摘要(英)

Our research sample contains Taiwanese listed and OTC firms from 2001 to 2006. The purpose of this research is to investigate how the characteristics of family business and corporate governance mechanism influence the repurchase policy of a firm. Using the Logit regression model, the results are as follows: 1. Family business has negative relationship with repurchase. 2. Divergence has inverted U shape relationship with repurchase. 3. Family CEO
is positively related to repurchase. However, when considering divergence, the result turns to negative. 4. Enterprise leader serving as chairman and CEO is positively associated with repurchase. However, the result turns to negative when considering divergence. 5. Outside directors in family businesses have better monitoring with more repurchase. 6. Second largest shareholders could cooperate with controlling business to benefit themselves. 7. institutional investors would push a business to increase repurchase.

關鍵字(中)

★ 家族企業
★ 股票買回
★ 代理理論

關鍵字(英)

★ Agency theory
★ Repurchase
★ Family business

論文目次

中文摘要....................................................................................................................................i
英文摘要.................................................................................................................................. ii
致謝................................................................................................................................. iii
目錄..................................................................................................................................iv
圖目錄.......................................................................................................................................v
表目錄.......................................................................................................................................v
第一章緒論............................................................................................................................1
第一節研究動機................................................................................................................1
第二節本文貢獻..................................................................................................................3
第二章文獻探討......................................................................................................................4
第一節公司治理與代理問題............................................................................................4
第二節台灣家族企業特性..................................................................................................5
第三節股票買回之動機..................................................................................................7
第四節假說建立..................................................................................................................9
2.4.1 家族企業之特性、股權結構與股票買回間之關係..............................................9
2.4.2 家族成員隸屬與股票買回之關係........................................................................12
2.4.3 家族企業之外部治理機制對股票買回的影響....................................................13
第三章研究方法....................................................................................................................17
第一節選樣準則與資料來源............................................................................................17
第二節研究模型與變數選取............................................................................................17
第四章實證分析..................................................................................................................23
第一節樣本分析..............................................................................................................23
第二節全體樣本實證結果................................................................................................28
第三節穩健性檢定............................................................................................................34
第五章結論與研究建議........................................................................................................36
參考文獻..............................................................................................................37
圖目錄
圖 1 偏離程度與股票買回政策之關係—1 ..........................................................................25
圖 2 偏離程度與股票買回政策之關係—2 ..........................................................................26
表目錄
表1 變數之操作性定義..........................................................................................................22
表2 總樣本敘述性統計..........................................................................................................23
表3 家族和非家族企業樣本之差異性檢定..........................................................................24
表4 偏離程度與股票買回政策關係......................................................................................25
表5 偏離程度與股票買回之關係-Logit regression...............................................................27
表6 Logit 迴歸分析結果......................................................................................................28

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指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

審核日期

2008-7-23

推文