| 摘要(英) |
This study bases on the model reported by Basu (1997) about the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, using stock returns to proxy for the publicly available market news. To begin with, this study surveys whether earnings of financial institutions in Taiwan have timeliness and conservatism principle. After Asian and Taiwanese financial crisis, corporate governance is more important day after day. Therefore, this study adds the corporate governance parameters to empirical model to survey whether corporate governance changes the timeliness and conservatism of earnings. Subsequently, this study applies F test to verify the time effect of empirical model. Finally, this study examines whether corporate governance affects the earnings transmission in different industries through empirical analysis in the industry level.
The results indicate that if the estimated period of stock returns and the announcement time of earnings are the same, the changes of stock returns are reacted effectively on earnings. Corporate governance does not significantly affect earnings of financial institutions in Taiwan and change the timeliness and conservatism of earnings. Evidence from using fixed effects model shows that time effect has great influences on earnings and makes the timeliness and conservatism of earnings cut down. As for the empirical analysis of insurance companies, this study shows that robust corporate governance makes the timeliness and conservatism of earnings change; if insurance companies have more robust corporate governance, the timeliness of earnings becomes quicker; although the rate that earnings react to bad news becomes slow, it is still faster than the rate that earnings react to good news. |
| 參考文獻 |
參考文獻
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