摘要(英) |
Summary
Due to the domestic accident stocks incidents happened recently, the relevant operation problems of the financial report jump out to the stage. Under the inefficient management, they use the method of earning management to trump up the result, and also decorate the report by the advantage of information asymmetric. However, when the company does some earning management to the financial report, the investors and banking market often could not find the mistakes or differences. That will be the big loss in the future. The companies, which applied for going public or collected funds often, do the management to beautify the surplus numbers and financial surface. Besides, they could get the trust of the all investors and the relevant monetary institutions to reach the goal of going on the market.
This research report is based on the data of the companies which are IPO and SPO as samples, and discuss whether it has the obvious differences or not if the managers deal with the earning management under different levels. In addition, it checks out whether it has different reasons or not for the earning management through the sides of operations, finances, the stock strategies or any other controlling variables. In this report, the samples have been separated for the company with financial pressure or non-financial pressure according to “MMH” model. Therefore, it could check whether the companies have different earning managements or not if they carry out the mission under the different financial pressure.
As the result, the companies who are in the current year and the last year for IPO and SPO respectively all have the different factors in making the financial planning for different industries under different financial pressure. And they have the same portions as well. For instance, the strength variable of investing、ROE variable、the rate variable of sales growth , they can explain the financial activities and the behavior of earning management. And in the other hand, the profit management behavior could proof the degree of the strength of investing, and the ratio of liabilities to be the explaining variables. They proof the performance.
Investors, Master bureau and the institution of underwriting must choose the different variables in order to measure companies which has already been on the market accurately according to different fund-collections and financial pressure. |
參考文獻 |
參考文獻
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