摘要(英) |
For China Development Industrial Bank, Mega International Commercial Bank and Taiwan Development Industrial Bank, their professional investment case screening and appraisal capability distinguish themselves from practices by other investment institutions. Thus, operational performance of their reinvestment greatly affects the bank’s profit.
Since the production enterprises invested by these banks, constantly are rated as in the growth stage of its industrial life cycle, in turn, these enterprises desperately need capital infusion from licensed industrial banks, in order to facilitate and sustain operation and factory growth expansion.
After delving into internationalization and industry diversification for bank’s holding companies, which are in essence reflecting the status and threats from its long term competitiveness, thus, mission of strategy must be closely examined and carefully thought out. The core of decision mechanism resides at board supervision and control, supported with professional managerial planning, execution and control, in order to achieve the goal of both maximizing the shareholder profit and managing enterprise operation growth. Decision mechanism of the board is a vital part of internal corporate governance, affecting the inclination of corporate strategy. So, different inclination would influence the corporate performance with varied results.
The findings of this research are: most of the holding companies for these three banks are heavily concentrated in research-intensive electronic product industry. The more holdings by the management, the lesser the focuses unto internationalization and industry diversification. The larger the portion of external board membership, the heavier the focus onto strategy innovation by the corporate. The greater the magnitude of board, the lesser focus onto strategy innovation by the corporate.
The higher the internationalization for companies with heavy industry concentration, the more notable the performance than other types of company. Based on this, this study can safely predict: the more internationalization, the better the operation performance. The heavier the diversification, the worse the operation performance. The higher the R&D expenditure, the better the operation performance. The bigger the magnitude of industry-diversified corporation with low level of internationalization, the lesser the operation risks. Nevertheless, for those less internationalized corporation with heavy industry concentration, the higher the ratio of indebtedness to net worth, the greater the leverage influence, and finally the higher the operation risk. The higher the external board membership in addition to higher ratio of stockholding by management level, the better the operation performance. The bigger the board’s magnitude and size plus higher ratio of pledge of stockholding by board members, the worse the operation performance. And the operation performance for China Development Industrial Bank is rated better than those of the holding companies for Mega International Commercial Bank and Taiwan Development Industrial Bank.
This study proposes suggestions for future industrial bank investment operation: 1. Precede investment case screening and appraisal with caution, with in depth knowledge and industry pulse gauging. Timely adjust and realize investment portfolio for profit. Execute investment appraisal professionally to maximize shareholder’s profit. 2. Adopt adequate internationalization, relevant diversification and innovation tactics in addition to enhance the supervisory functionality and corporate governance mechanism. Finally, achieve maximization for industry’s investment asset performance. 3. Continue cooperate with distinguished, well-known oversea investment institutions, and invest in the investment fund from US and European area to diversify inherent industry and area risks. 4. Pay close attention to US and European research studies on industry type with limited partnership and technological innovation, and ensuing impacts onto investment operation for domestic industrial bank. |
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