| 摘要(英) |
Educational signaling model was proposed by Michael Spence in 1973. In the paper, he suggested that employers will learn the individual’s productive capabilities by some available information. And the key assumption is that the costs of signaling are negatively correlated with productivity. Then, the one with higher productivity will gain higher education. Countersignal theory was proposed by Feltovich, Harbaugh and To in 2002.The main idea is that high-quality types will signal to differentiate themselves from lower types, but sometimes high types may choose to not signal, or “countersignal”.
In this study, we investigated the students of Financial Department and Information Management Department of 13 major universities in Taiwan to know the students’’ willingness of getting certifications. We grouped the above 13 universities into three tiers by their university entrance examination scores to see that if countersignal will happen among the first tier-university students. In addition, we also examine whether there is any substitutive or complementary relation between diploma and certifications? And what are the main reasons that will affect individuals to spend time and effort in getting certifications?
Our empirical results confirm that the first-tier- university students have some reservations in taking the relevant certification tests. On the contrary, the third tier-university students have much stronger willingness in taking relevant certification tests. As such, in this study we can confirm that there exists a complementary relation between diploma and certifications among the third-tier-university students while there exist countersignal phenomena for first-tier-university students. |
| 參考文獻 |
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