股權結構和負債資金成本關係之研究

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姓名

羅耀宗(Yao-Tsung Lo) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

股權結構和負債資金成本關係之研究
(Corporate Ownership Structure and the Cost od Debt: Evidence from Taiwan)

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本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

在控制股東和公司其他利害關係人間的資訊不對稱會引發道德風險以及逆選擇的
問題，進而增加投資人的代理風險。好的公司治理機制，能夠監督管理者並且改善資訊
品質。本篇論文把焦點著重在公司管理當局以及債權人間的代理問題。這篇研究的主要
目的是要探討公司股權結構和負債資金成本間的關係。實證結果發現，最終控制股東所
持有的現金流量權比例和負債資金成本有負向的關係，另外我們也發現，投票權的持有
比例以及投票權對現金流量權的背離程度，兩者皆和負債資金成本有正向的關係。

摘要(英)

Information asymmetry between controlling group and other stakeholders will induce moral hazard and adverse selection, which increase the agency risk bearing by investors. Good corporate governance may be a path to monitor the management as well as improve information quality. This paper focuses on the agency problem between management and bondholders. The primary objective of this study is to explore the association between ownership structure and the cost of debt financing. We find that the level of cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling owners is negatively related to the cost of debt. We also find that the level of the divergence between voting and cash flow rights is positively related to the cost of debt financing.

關鍵字(中)

★ 股權結構
★ 公司治理
★ 債務成本
★ 信用評等

關鍵字(英)

★ Cost of debt
★ Credit ratings
★ Corporate governance
★ Ownership structure

論文目次

Abstract ................................................................................................................................... iv
Index ........................................................................................................................................ vi
Table & Figure ........................................................................................................................ vii
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Literature review and Hypothesis Development ............................................................ 3
2.1 Cause of concentrated ownership .................................................................................................. 3
2.2 Incentive and Entrenchment effect ................................................................................................ 5
2.3 Ownership structure and firm value ............................................................................................ 5
2.4 Corporate governance and the cost of debt. ................................................................................. 9
2.5 Ownership structure in East Asia .............................................................................................. 12
2.6 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................... 14
3. Research Design ............................................................................................................... 15
3.1 Empirical models ........................................................................................................................ 15
3.2 Definitions of variables ............................................................................................................... 16
3.2.1 Dependent variables ............................................................................................................. 17
3.2.2 Independent variables - corporate governance measures ..................................................... 18
3.2.3 Control variables .................................................................................................................. 18
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics .................................................................. 19
5. Regression Results ........................................................................................................... 23
6. Additional Analyses ......................................................................................................... 34
7. Limitations and further research ................................................................................... 38
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 39
Reference ............................................................................................................................... 40

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指導教授

曹壽民(Shou-Min Tsao)

審核日期

2009-11-13

推文