運用羅吉斯迴歸探討企業績效、公司治理與經理人異動之關聯性

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柯欽瀚(Chin-han Ko) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所在職專班

論文名稱

運用羅吉斯迴歸探討企業績效、公司治理與經理人異動之關聯性
(Exploring the relationship between corporate performance, corporate governance and management turnover by logistic regression)

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摘要(中)

隨著國內高科技產業的蓬勃發展，產業間的競爭日益增高，企業經營以績效為導向的概念已是目前的主流趨勢。在如此高度競爭的環境下，加上電子產業人才的同質性高，一旦企業經營績效不佳，經理人更迭的情形頻繁可見，然而企業經理人異動的多由公司治理團隊所決策，也代表公司治理機制和經理人異動應有一定程度之關聯性。故本研究挑選國內上市公司市值前100大的電子公司作為研究樣本(樣本期間為2011年至2012年)，除了電子產業間經理人的流動性相較其他傳統產業來的高外，規模較大的企業，經理人績效與異動的關聯也較具代表性，並以羅吉斯迴歸 (Logistic Regression) 模型，進行企業績效、公司治理與經理人異動之關聯性探討。
本研究實證結果顯示企業績效與經理人異動間呈現顯著的負相關，表示當企業績效下滑時，經理人異動的機會越高；而公司治理變數中，僅有董事會規模與經理人異動間有直接負相關；在分析公司治理對於企業績效與經理人異動的調節效果中，研究發現法人持股比率、外部董事比率及董事長兼任總經理這三個公司治理變數，對於企業績效與經理人異動之負相關有弱化的干擾效果；而董事席次控制比率對於企業績效與經理人異動之負相關則有強化的干擾效果。至於股份盈餘偏離倍數則不論直接或間接關係，皆與經理人異動無顯著的關聯性。

摘要(英)

With the increasing competition of domestic high-tech industry, business performance-oriented is main stream. Due to such a highly competitive environment, management turnovers frequently appear once the poor business performance happened. This study picked domestic top 100 electronic companies as research samples (from 2011 to 2012), and explored the correlation between corporate performance, corporate governance and management turnover by logistic regression.
The results of this study are as follows: The correlation between corporate performance and management turnover is significantly negative, it means less corporate performance, higher management turnover; Board size is also directly negative related with management turnover; The percentage of outside directors and the percentage shareholding of institution and CEO duality have weakened moderate effect on the negative correlation between corporate performance and management turnover; Controlled ratio of directors has strengthened moderate effect on the negative correlation between corporate performance and management turnover.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理
★ 經理人異動
★ 董事會組成
★ 企業績效

關鍵字(英)

★ corporate governance
★ management turnover
★ the composition of board
★ corporate performance

論文目次

第一章緒論-------------------------1
第一節研究動機及背景-----------------1
第二節研究目的----------------------3
第三節研究架構與流程-----------------3
第二章文獻探討----------------------5
第一節公司治理----------------------5
第二節經理人異動--------------------12
第三節公司治理因素與經理人異動之關係----14
第三章研究假說與方法-----------------16
第一節研究假說----------------------16
第二節研究架構與變數定義--------------21
第三節研究樣本與研究期間--------------24
第四節統計分析方法及實證模型-----------24
第四章實證結果與分析-----------------27
第一節敘述統計與相關係數分析-----------27
第二節羅吉斯迴歸分析-----------------30
第三節彙整與討論--------------------36
第五章結論與建議--------------------39
第一節研究結論與管理意涵--------------39
第二節研究限制與建議-----------------40
參考文獻 -----------------------------41

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指導教授

陳明園(Ming-yuan Chen)

審核日期

2014-7-7

推文