高階經理人誘因薪酬與審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊對公司生產效率之影響

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姓名

羅孝妍(Hsiao-Yen Lo) 查詢紙本館藏

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會計研究所

論文名稱

高階經理人誘因薪酬與審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊對公司生產效率之影響
(The Impact of CEO Incentive Compensation and Compensation/Audit Committees Overlap on Productive Efficiency)

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摘要(中)

本研究使用2005年到2012年美國公司資料為樣本，探討高階經理人誘因薪酬、審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與公司生產效率之間的關聯性。本研究使用SFA模型(Stochastic Frontier Analysis Model)來衡量公司生產效率，其生產函數所產生的參數與無效率效果是同時評估計算的。在控制產業類別後，公司高階經理人誘因薪酬與公司生產效率為正相關；審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊與公司生產效率呈現負相關；最後研究公司在審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊的公司治理情況下，高階經理人誘因薪酬與公司生產效率關係是否會受影響以及如何影響，發現高階經理人誘因薪酬與審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊比率的交乘項與公司生產效率為負相關，足以顯示公司治理與董事會制度的重要性。總而言之，結果顯示在評估公司生產效率和公司經濟表現時，高階經理人薪酬結構與董事會結構為重要考量因素之一。

摘要(英)

This study uses 2005-2012 data of all the US firms. We examine the relationship between CEO incentive compensation, compensation/audit committees overlap and technical productive efficiency. We use stochastic frontier analysis model which the parameters of a stochastic frontier function are estimated simultaneously with the inefficiency effects. After controlling for the industry, CEO incentive compensation is positively related to productive efficiency. However, compensation/audit committees overlap is negatively related to productive efficiency. Last, we examine whether and how the relationship between CEO incentive compensation and productive efficiency will be influenced under compensation/audit committees overlap. We find that the intersection of CEO incentive compensation and compensation/audit committees overlap is negatively related to productive efficiency. It implies the importance of corporate governance and board structure. In sum, the results suggest that both the structure of CEO compensation and board are important factors when assessing the productive efficiency and economic performance of firms.

關鍵字(中)

★ 高階經理人誘因薪酬
★ 審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊
★ 生產效率
★ 隨機前緣分析

關鍵字(英)

★ CEO incentive compensation
★ compensation/audit committee overlap
★ productive efficiency
★ stochastic frontier analysis

論文目次

摘要 I
Abstract II
致謝辭 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究背景、動機與目的 1
1-2 研究架構 5
第二章文獻探討與研究問題 7
2-1 高階經理人薪酬與公司績效 7
2-2 審計與薪酬委員會成員重疊 10
2-3 研究問題 12
第三章研究設計 16
3-1 樣本選取 16
3-2 變數定義 17
3-3實證模型 24
第四章實證結果與分析 28
4-1 敘述性統計分析 28
4-2 相關係數分析 31
4-3 迴歸分析結果 34
4-4 額外證實測試 40
第五章結論與建議 46
參考文獻 47

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指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-Chi Lu)

審核日期

2014-8-19

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