R&D投資與明確的財務績效衡量對CEO薪酬的相對重要性：家族管理的調節作用

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姓名

林哲弘(Che-hung Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

R&D投資與明確的財務績效衡量對CEO薪酬的相對重要性：家族管理的調節作用
(The Relative Importance of R&D Investments versus Explicit Financial Performance Measures on CEO Compensation: the Moderating Role of Family Management)

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摘要(中)

鑑於企業可以藉由R&D投資與CEO薪酬之間存在較大的關連性來防止CEO投機的減少R&D投資行為，本研究以台灣R&D密集產業為樣本探討家族所有權對R&D投資與CEO薪酬之間的關聯性。實證結果發現，家族企業的CEO薪酬較多依據R&D投資來衡量而較少依據明確的財務績效指標來衡量（即ROA）。此外，相對於先前的研究結果，本研究提供的證據顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業投入更多的R&D且R&D效率較高。此一實證結果顯示，家族企業的薪酬結構是基於R&D的投資來鼓勵CEO從事增值的R&D投資，而不是藉由帝國主義來剝削少數股東之利益。

摘要(英)

Given that firms can prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D investment by establishing a greater positive association between R&D investment and CEO compensation, this study examines a sample of Taiwan’s R&D-intensive industries to investigate the impact of founding family ownership on the association between R&D investment and CEO compensation. The results show that CEO compensation of family firms depends more on R&D investment and less on explicit financial performance measures (i.e., return on assets). In addition, in contrast to previous findings, the study provides evidence that family firms invest more in R&D and show greater R&D efficiency relative to nonfamily firms. This result suggests that family firms’ compensation structure based on R&D investment encourages CEOs to engage in value-enhancing R&D investment rather than in empire building to expropriate minority shareholders.

關鍵字(中)

★ CEO薪酬
★ 家族企業
★ R&D投資
★ 短視R&D投資行為

關鍵字(英)

★ R&D investment
★ CEO compensation
★ family firms
★ myopic R&D investment behavior

論文目次

Chinese Abstract……………………………………………………………………i
English Abstract……………………………………………………………………ii
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………….iii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………….iv
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….v
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………….vi
1. Introduction……………………….…………………………………………1
2. Literature review………………..…………………………………… ……9
3. Hypotheses……….………………………………………………………..11
4. Methods……………………………………………………………………15
4.1. Sample selection………………………………………………………15
4.2. Variables……………………………………………………………….18
4.3. Analysis……..…………………………………………………………20
5. Empirical Results……………………………..……………………………23
5.1. Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………..23
5.2. The moderating role of family ownership on the relation between R&D
investment and CEO compensation………………………..…………25
5.3. Information advantage and longer investment horizon arguments or risk aversion argument?.....................31
6. Additional analysis………………………………….…………………….38
6.1. Family ownership and R&D investment…………………………….38
6.2. Family ownership and R&D investment efficiency……………39
6.3. Controlling for potential endogeneity……………………………….44
6.4. Controlling for sample selection bias………………….…………….46
7. Discussion…………………………………………………………………46
8. Conclusion…………………………….…………………………………..49
References……………………………………………………………………53

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指導教授

曹壽民(Shou-min Tsao)

審核日期

2015-1-8

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