複門號現象與行動電信廠商的訂價決策

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余聖理(Sheng-Li Yu) 查詢紙本館藏

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經濟學系

論文名稱

複門號現象與行動電信廠商的訂價決策

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摘要(中)

我們依據既有電信產業文獻假設，設計一個成本對稱的廠商採取二部訂價法以及網
內外差別訂價法的行動電信市場模型，並設定行動電信廠商間的價格競爭為一個兩階段賽局，廠商將於賽局第一階段會共同協定統一的接續費水準(但若當局對接續費採行管制則廠商僅於第二階段競爭)，第二階段則分別對網內通話價與網外通話價差別訂價，最終消費者再依據廠商間的訂價決策來決定消費者均衡。

其次，我們再額外考慮網內價格效益與門號數量效益，令消費者的門號數量決策內
生化來放寬既有文獻的單門號訂閱假設，使之更符合台灣實務。藉由修改霍特林的空間競爭模型的方式，令複門號現象得以分析；我們將新發展的模型稱之為複門號模型。
藉由複門號模型進行電信市場結構分析後我們主要得出以下三個結論：

首先，當門號提供成本f 愈低、總邊際成本c 愈低，網內相對淨效用水準r = v/τ 愈高且接續成本加成比率m 愈高時，行動電信市場將會出現複門號現象且隨之加重；但若複門號現象不存在，則行動電信市場應改採既有文獻中的單門號模型設定進行分析。

其次，目前我國接續費水準受到NCC 所管制，倘若NCC 完全放棄對接續費的管制
任由市場決定，則成本對稱、資費採取二部訂價與網內外差別訂價的廠商，在自由競爭下將於賽局第一階段統一協定一個等同邊際接續成本的接續費水準 ǎπ = c0 (亦即m =0)，此時網內價等於網外價並且等於總邊際成本c，廠商完全依靠月租費獲利;且複門號現象絕不會發生。

最後，基於社會福利的觀點，除非在門號提供成本f 很低且網內相對淨效用水準
r=v(c | η)/τ很高的特殊市場結構下，NCC 透過管制調高接續費至某一水準以上甚至完全禁止跨網通話(m→∞)因此促進複門號現象，才有辦法改善社會福利；否則一般來說，正如同既有文獻主張，NCC 應當調降接續費至邊際接續成本水準(a = c0)導致複門號現象消失，來達到社會福利極大化(本文中另證明在此情況下，當局放棄對接續費的管制亦能達到同樣政策效果)。

儘管如此，在面對某些市場結構下既有文獻的福利分析將產生嚴重偏誤這一點，仍是我們研究的新發現。

摘要(英)

According to our assumption that both the telecom industry literature, symmetrical design cost manufacturers to take a non-linear pricing method and network operations inside and
outside the difference in pricing law telecommunications market model, and set the price competition among manufacturers of telecommunications operations for a two-stage game, Board game makers will be the first phase of a common agreement uniform standard access fee (but if regulatory authorities to adopt the butt renewals manufacturers compete only in the second stage), the second phase of the network were to call the call price and the external network price difference between pricing, pricing decisions based on the final consumer and then to decide between vendors consumer equilibrium.

Secondly, let us consider the extra price within the network efficiency and effectiveness of the number of Multi-cellphone, so that the number of decisions in the Multi-cellphone of consumers to relax both biochemical literature single-cellphone of Subscribe assumptions to make it more in line with practice in Taiwan. By modifying Hotelling spatial competition model the way in which to analyze the Multi-cellphone phenomenon; model we will develop new model called the Multi-cellphone model.

By Multi-cellphone phenomenon after the telecommunications market structure model analysis we draw the following three main conclusions:

First, when the door to provide cost f the lower number, the lower the total marginal cost c, the relative net utility network level r = v / τ higher and higher when the cost-plus rate m follow, action telecommunications market will be re-door No phenomenon and subsequently increase; but if Multi-cellphone does not exist, the action should shift to the telecommunications market in the literature both single-cellphone model number set for analysis.

Second, the current level of connection fees are regulated by the NCC, NCC completely abandoned if the docking control renewals let the market decide, the cost of symmetry, pricing and tariffs take nonlinear pricing difference between internal and external network vendors, under free competition will The first phase innings in a unified agreement connection fee equivalent to the standard marginal costs follow ǎπ = c0 (ie m = 0), this time in the net-net price equal to marginal cost equals the total price and c, manufacturers rely entirely on monthly fee profit; and Multi-cellphone phenomenon will never happen.

Finally, based on the viewpoint of social welfare, unless the cost of f at door number is relatively low and the network net utility level r = v (c | η) / τ under high specific market structure, NCC through regulatory access fees continue to increase above a certain level even if a complete ban on cross Netcom (m → ∞) thus facilitating Multi-cellphone phenomenon,only way to improve social welfare; otherwise, in general, just as the existing literature advocates, NCC should continue to cut costs to marginal access cost level (a = c0) leads to double door number disappears, to achieve social welfare maximization (another article to prove in this case, the authorities can also give up control of the docking renewals policy to achieve the same effect). Nevertheless, in the face of certain market structure analysis under both the welfare literature would have serious bias that is still new finding of our study.

關鍵字(中)

★ 接續費
★ 經濟
★ 電信
★ 產業
★ 二部訂價
★ 差別訂價
★ 網路

關鍵字(英)

★ access fee
★ economic
★ telecommunication
★ industry
★ two-part tariffs
★ Price Discrimination
★ network

論文目次

目錄
摘要 ..................................................... i
ABSTRACT ................................................ ii
誌謝 ...................................................... iv
圖目錄 List of Figures ................................................ vii
表目錄 List of Tables ................................................ viii
符號說明 ...................................................... ix
一、緒論 ................................................. 1
1-1 研究動機 .............................................. 1
1-2 研究設計與研究議題 ....................................................... 4
1-3 消費者訂閱複門號的兩種主要誘因 ....................................................... 5
1-4 研究架構 ....................................................... 7
二、文獻回顧........................................................ 8
三、基本假設與模型設定 ...................................................... 12
3-1 基礎說明：複門號模型與單門號模型 ...................................................... 12
3-2 發話端付費模式(Calling party pays model). ................................................. 12
3-3 平衡發話模式 (Balanced calling pattern). ............................................... 12
3-4 訂價策略：非線性訂價(Nonlinear Pricing)與差別訂價(Price discrimination )..........................................13
3-5 兩階段賽局與共同協定接續費(Reciprocal access pricing，RAP ) ................................................... 13
3-6 成本結構 ...................................................... 13
3-7 需求結構 ...................................................... 14
四、存在複門號現象時的門號訂閱率與競爭均衡 ...................................................... 19
4-1 門號訂閱率 ...................................................... 19
4-2 利潤函數 ...................................................... 21
4-3 福利函數 .......................................................22
4-4 比例原則( Proportionality rule) ................................................... 22
4-5 相對淨效用 ...................................................... 25
4-6 月租費不對稱性 ...................................................... 28
4-7 網內外淨效用差距與單位接續收入 ...................................................... 30
4-8 賽局第二階段競爭均衡下月租費水準 ...................................................... 32
4-9 月租費競爭均衡下的門號訂閱率 ...................................................... 35
4-10 競爭均衡下的利潤函數與福利函數....................................................... 38
五、複門號模型適用條件 .......................................................40
六、不存在複門號現象時的門號訂閱率與競爭均衡....................................................... 43
6-1 重音符號與上標說明 ...................................................... 43
6-2 不存在複門號現象時的經濟分析 ...................................................... 43
6-3 當局放棄接續費管制權時廠商自由談判下的共同協定接續費與複門號現象 ...................................................... 47
七、管制觀點下令社會福利極大化的最適接續費水準 ...................................................... 50
7-1 接續費與社會福利 ...................................................... 50
7-2 福利觀點下的最適接續費與複門號現象 ...................................................... 52
7-3 市場結構對管制下最適接續費水準的影響 ...................................................... 56
八、參數模擬法驗證 ...................................................... 59
8-1 初始消費者均衡 ...................................................... 59
8-2 複門號現象發生時的月租費競爭均衡 ...................................................... 63
8-3 不存在複門號現象時的月租費競爭均衡與接續費競爭均衡 ...................................................... 66
8-4 社會福利觀點下針對不同市場結構應採取的最適接續費管制政策 ...................................................... 69
九、結論 ...................................................... 72
參考文獻 ................................................. 77

參考文獻

吳大任，陳俊宏，「網路經濟中的接續費訂價決策」，財務金融學刊，第15 卷第4 期， 1-18 頁，2007。

吳大任，陳恭平與黃晏奇, “Essays on Two-Sided Markets:Searching , Matching and Multi-Homing”, pp.48-56,2012。

施俊吉，「電信互連與接續互惠」，經濟論文叢刊，37(1)，79-98 頁，2009。

ALEXANDER , R., K ,“A tractable cross-nested logit model for evaluating Two-way interconnection competition with multiple network subscription”, pp.1-228, 2003.

ARMSTRONG, M., “Network Interconnection”, The Economic Journal, Vol.108,No. 448, pp.545-564,May 1998.

CARTER , M., AND J. WRIGHT, “Interconnection in Network Industries”, Review of Industrial Organization 14, pp.1–25, 1999.

DESSEIN, W. ,“Network competition in nonlinear pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 593–611,Winter 2003.

DESSEIN, W. , “Network competition with heterogeneous customers and calling patterns”, Rand Journal of Economics, Information Economics and Policy 16,pp. 323–345,2004.

LAFFONT, J.-J., P. REY, AND J. TIROLE, “Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1., pp.1-37,Spring, 1998.

LAFFONT, J.-J., P. REY, AND J. TIROLE , “Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination”, RAND Journal of Economics ,Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 38-56, Spring 1998.

指導教授

吳大任(Dachrahn Wu)

審核日期

2015-3-26

推文