中國集團企業之所有權結構與關係人交易對投資效率之影響

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姓名

林欣潔(Hsin-chieh Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

中國集團企業之所有權結構與關係人交易對投資效率之影響
(The Impacts of Ownership Structure and Related Party Transactions on Investment Efficiency: Evidence from Chinese Business Groups)

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已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本篇研究主要探討集團企業與非集團企業的投資效率差異，透過集團所帶來的正面或負面影響來釐清中國集團企業所扮演的內部資本市場角色，並進一步以所有權結構與關係人交易來解釋並勾勒影響中國集團企業的投資效率的原因。為了避開股改效果與閉鎖期間的影響，本研究以2009年至2013年間的上海與深圳A股上市公司為研究對象進行實證分析。研究結果顯示，集團企業相較於非集團企業有較高的投資效率，說明於中國市場，集團創造的內部資本市場扮演重要的角色。為了進一步探討形成集團企業相較於非集團企業投資效率高的原因，本研究從所有權結構與其使用關係人交易程度高低的角度切入。結果顯示，國有集團企業相較於國有非集團企業有較高的投資效率，而此結果是導因於在同為國有的所有權結構下，集團企業相對於非集團企業使用較低程度的關係人交易。

摘要(英)

This research investigates the difference of investment efficiency between business group and non-business group. Through shaping the role of internal capital markets that business groups play, we point out how the ownership structure and related party transactions affect the investment efficiency. In order to avoid the effect of the split-share structure reform and lockup period that will affect the market price when we measure the investment opportunity, the sample we choose includes listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2013. We find that business groups have better investment efficiency than non-business groups, indicating that business groups in China indeed act as an important internal capital market. From the point of view of ownership structure and related party transactions, we find that state-owned business groups have better investment efficiency than state-owned non-business groups, because state-owned business groups use less related party transactions than state-owned non-business groups.

關鍵字(中)

★ 投資效率
★ 集團企業
★ 關係人交易
★ 所有權結構

關鍵字(英)

★ Investment efficiency
★ Business groups
★ Related party transactions
★ Ownership structure

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究動機與目的 1
1-2 研究貢獻 3
第二章文獻探討與假說建立 5
2-1 中國資本市場環境 5
2-2 中國集團企業與投資效率 6
2-2-1 中國集團企業與非集團企業的投資效率 7
2-2-2 所有權結構與集團企業的投資效率 9
2-2-3 關係人交易與集團企業的投資效率 10
第三章研究方法 13
3-1 資料來源與樣本選擇 13
3-2 研究方法與研究模型 13
第四章實證研究結果 17
4-1 敘述性統計 17
4-2 相關性分析 23
4-3 迴歸分析 25
4-4 穩健性測試 30
第五章結論與建議 33
5-1 研究結論 33
5-2 研究限制與建議 33
參考文獻 35

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華、蔡盈如(Jung-hua Hung Ying-ju Tsai)

審核日期

2015-6-10

推文