股權激勵薪酬之價值攸關性——以中國A股市場為例

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姓名

肖雪(Xiao Xue) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

股權激勵薪酬之價值攸關性——以中國A股市場為例
(The Relevance between Stock Ownership Incentive Compensation and Enterprise Value: Taking Chinese A-Share Market Firms as an Example)

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摘要(中)

本研究探討中國之股權激勵薪酬（Equity-Based Incentive Compensation）與公司價值之攸關性。中國之股權激勵薪酬制度在股權分置改革之後得以快速發展。而根據中國之市場機制與政策規定，限制性股票薪酬與股票選擇權薪酬在授予價格以及權利與義務等方面存在差異，如限制性股票在授予初期最低可達到市價五折之折扣，對員工之激勵效果相對較為明顯。據此，本研究預期中國之股權激勵薪酬與公司價值具有显著正向攸關性，而因中國股票市場環境與股權激勵薪酬授予機制之特殊性，預期相較於股票選擇權薪酬而言，限制性股票薪酬會具有較高的價值攸關性。
本研究以2006年至2013年中國A股上市公司共1011個觀察值為樣本進行實證分析。當使用所有授予員工以股權激勵薪酬之公司樣本進行實證分析時，發現投資人對公司未來股價有正面看法，股權激勵薪酬與公司價值具有显著正向攸關性。再者，當使用同時授予員工股票選擇權薪酬與限制性股票薪酬之公司樣本進行實證分析時，發現限制性股票薪酬的價值攸關性比股票選擇權薪酬更為正面。

摘要(英)

This research investigates the relationships between equity-based incentive compensation and firm value in China. Since split-share structure reform, the equity-based incentive compensation system of China has developed rapidly. According to the market mechanisms and policies of China, the differences exist between restricted stock and stock option in grant price as well as other aspects like rights and obligations. For example, restricted stock could be granted to the employees at some a half of its market price. Incentive effects of restricted stock are relatively obvious. Based on the reasons above, our research expects Chinese equity-based incentive compensation has significant positive effects on firm value. Compared to the relevance between stock option compensation and firm value, the relevance between restricted stock compensation and firm value is expected to be higher under China’s special circumstance of stock market and the grant mechanism for equity-based incentives compensation.
Our research use the samples include 1011 observations of Chinese A-share market firms from 2006 to 2013 for empirical analysis. From the results of analyzing all the samples of firms which granted equity-based incentive compensations to their employees, we can draw a conclusion that equity compensation will affect firm value significantly when investors have a positive view of the firm’s future stock price. Besides, when we analyze the samples of firms based on granting restricted stocks and stock options to employees at the same time, the results show us that restricted stock compensation affects firm value a more positive way than option compensation does.

關鍵字(中)

★ 股權激勵薪酬
★ 股票選擇權
★ 限制性股票
★ 公司價值

關鍵字(英)

★ equity-based incentives compensation
★ restricted stock
★ stock option
★ firm value

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
一、緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 2
1.3 研究架構 3
二、股權分置改革以及股權激勵薪酬制度 4
2.1 中國證券市場 4
2.1.1 中國證券市場簡介 4
2.1.2 股票的分類 4
2.1.3 市場的分類 5
2.2 股權分置改革 7
2.3 股權激勵薪酬制度 8
2.3.1 股權激勵薪酬之定義 8
2.3.2 中國應用股權激勵薪酬之類型 8
2.3.3 股票選擇權與限制性股票之對比 9
2.3.4 中國股權激勵制度之發展——在股權分置改革前後 11
三、文獻探討與假說 13
3.1 股權激勵薪酬之價值攸關性 13
3.2 股票選擇權與限制性股票之價值攸關性對比 14
四、研究設計 17
4.1 研究期間、樣本篩選標準與資料蒐集 17
4.1.1 研究期間 17
4.1.2 樣本篩選標準與資料蒐集 17
4.2 實證模型及變數定義 19
4.2.1 衡量股權激勵薪酬價值攸關性之模型 19
4.2.2 股票選擇權薪酬與限制性股票薪酬價值攸關性比較之模型 20
五、實證結果 22
5.1 假說一之實證結果 22
5.1.1 敘述統計 22
5.1.2 實證結果 23
5.2 假說二之實證結果 26
5.2.1 第一階段回歸之敘述統計 26
5.2.2 第一階段回歸之實證結果 26
5.2.3 第二階段回歸之敘述統計 27
5.2.4 第二階段回歸之實證結果 28
5.3 敏感性分析 31
5.3.1 僅採用RS或SO樣本之內生性問題考量 31
5.3.2 假說二之第二階段回歸式變數設定考量 35
5.3.3 變數的衡量方式 36
六、結論 37
6.1 結論 37
6.2 研究貢獻、限制與建議 38
參考文獻 39
中文文獻 39
英文文獻 40
網路資料 42

參考文獻

中文文獻
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和君諮詢集團，2013，中國股權激勵年度報告2013：1-25。
經邦集團，2013，2013年股權激勵報告：1-26。
莊磊，2014，中國股市的制度變遷及改革路徑選擇，南方金融，總第449期：77-84。
楊青淳與王有森，2006，股權激勵的中國路徑，西部論叢，第三期：41-44。
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于妮，2008，淺析基於股權分置改革的股權激勵機制，黑龍江對外經貿，第1期：91-92。
謝華與王慧娟，2012，股權激勵和公司績效的實證分析——基於中國2006-2010年數據，無錫商業職業技術學院學報，第12卷第5期（10月）：10-17。
劉佑銘，2012，關於上市公司股權激勵效應的實證研究，華南師範大學學報（社會科學版），第3期（6月）：109-114。
林大龐與蘇冬蔚，2011，股權激勵與公司業績——基於盈餘管理視角的新研究，金融研究，第9期：162-177。
楊成炎、劉薇與劉珍，2011，股票期權和限制性股票激勵制度的比較與選擇，第26卷第4期（7月）：55-57。
周凌燕，2012，限制性股票與股票期權的實施效果差異，中小企業管理與科技，第12期：67-68。

英文文獻
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網路資料
百度百科 http://www.baike.baidu.com/
中國政府網 http://www.gov.cn/

指導教授

王曉雯(Hsiao-wen Wang)

審核日期

2015-7-13

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