公司治理與企業社會責任對獨特性風險之影響

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劉郁呈(Yu-Cheng Liu) 查詢紙本館藏

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論文名稱

公司治理與企業社會責任對獨特性風險之影響
(The Influence of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility on Idiosyncratic Volatility)

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摘要(中)

近年來，由於許多知名企業陸續發生重大舞弊事件，引起大眾對於公司治理議題的重視，因此台灣在股東權力、董事會職能及資訊透明度等公司治理層面皆有大幅進步。然而根據Freeman (1984) 提出的利害關係人理論，公司的實際擁有者除了股東之外，還包括員工、供應商及社會大眾等利害關係人，因此企業除了確保股東價值最大化之外，也必須重視利害關係人的權益，因此企業社會責任的觀念也開始興起。本研究的目的為探討公司治理及企業社會責任對獨特性風險的影響，並進一步探討在不同公司治理程度的情況下，企業社會責任對獨特性風險的影響是否會有所差異。

本研究以2007年至2014年的台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本，採用Xu and Malkiel (2003) 及Ferreira and Laux (2007) 提出的方法衡量獨特性風險，並以股份盈餘偏離差、董監事持股質押比率、機構投資人持股比率、席次盈餘偏離差、獨立董監事比率、董事長兼任總經理及資訊透明度等變數作為公司治理變數，衡量公司治理、企業社會責任與獨特性風險之關聯。

實證結果發現，若以Xu and Malkiel (2003) 的直接分解法所得出的獨特性風險作為被解釋變數，股份盈餘偏離差、資訊透明度及企業社會責任對於獨特性風險有顯著的負面影響；此外，如果公司的機構投資人持股比率或獨立董監事持股比率較高，企業社會責任對其獨特性風險的負面影響會較小。若以Ferreira and Laux (2007) 的研究方法衡量的獨特性風險作為被解釋變數，股份盈餘偏離差對於獨特性風險有顯著的負面影響；董監事持股質押比率、機構投資人持股比率則對獨特性風險有顯著的正面影響。

摘要(英)

In recent years, there were a large number of business scandals, which make the public takes the issue of corporate governance seriously. Therefore, there is an extraordinary improvement in the rights of shareholders, the responsibilities of the board and information transparency in Taiwan. However, according to stakeholder theory which was proposed by Freeman in 1984, besides stockholders, stakeholders which includes employees, suppliers, and the public also have possession of the company. Accordingly, besides maximizing stockholders’ wealth, the corporate has to attach importance to the right of stakeholders. Consequently, the concept of corporate social responsibility was coming in gradually. The purpose of this thesis is to study the influence of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility on idiosyncratic volatility. Furthermore, the aim of this study is to examine whether there is differences in the influence of corporate social responsibility on idiosyncratic risk under different levels of corporate governance.

The data of this study are Taiwanese listed companies during the period of 2007 to 2014. We measure idiosyncratic risk by the measures of Xu and Malkiel (2003) and Ferreira and Laux (2007) separately. In addition, we use divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, the stock-on-pledge ratio among directors and supervisors, institutional investors’ shareholdings, divergence between the seat-control rights and cash flow rights, the percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board, CEO serving as the chairman, and information transparency as variables of corporate governance to discuss its relationship with corporate social responsibility and idiosyncratic risk.

If we use idiosyncratic risk which is measured by the methodology of Xu and Malkiel (2003) as the dependent variable, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, information transparency, and corporate social responsibility would have significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. Besides, if the company’s institutional investors’ shareholdings and or the percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board is higher, corporate social responsibility’s negative effect on idiosyncratic risk would become smaller. If we use idiosyncratic risk which is measured by the methodology of Ferreira and Laux (2007) as the dependent variable, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights would have significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the stock-on-pledge ratio among directors and supervisors and institutional investors’ shareholdings would have significant positive effect on idiosyncratic risk.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理
★ 企業社會責任
★ 獨特性風險

關鍵字(英)

★ Corporate Governance
★ Corporate Social Responsibility
★ Idiosyncratic Volatility

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iv
目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
表目錄 vii
一、緒論 1
1-1 研究背景與動機 1
1-2 研究目的 3
1-3 研究流程 3
二、文獻探討與假說發展 5
2-1 獨特性風險 5
2-2 公司治理 6
2-3 企業社會責任 8
2-4 公司治理與獨特性風險 10
2-5 企業社會責任與獨特性風險 16
2-6 公司治理的干擾效果 17
三、研究方法 19
3-1 研究架構 19
3-2 研究樣本與資料來源 20
3-3 變數定義與衡量 20
3-4 實證方法與統計方法 25
四、實證結果 29
4-1 敘述性統計分析 29
4-2 實證結果與分析 32
五、結論與建議 40
5-1 研究結論 40
5-2 研究限制與研究建議 41
參考文獻 44

圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖 4
圖3-1 研究架構圖 19

表目錄
表3-1 入選2007年~2013年「天下企業公民TOP 50」的樣本公司 23
表4-1 研究樣本敘述性統計量 30
表4-2 相關係數矩陣 31
表4-3 實證結果 34
表4-4 電子業實證結果 37
表5-1 研究結果整理 42

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指導教授

高櫻芬(Yin-Feng Gau)

審核日期

2016-1-13

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