激勵薪公司經營績效的影響：考慮策略選擇的內生性

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李佳蓉(Chia-Jung Li) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

激勵薪公司經營績效的影響：考慮策略選擇的內生性
(The Effect of Managerial Incentive Pay on Firm Performance: Considering Endogeneity When Assessing Strategy Performance)

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摘要(中)

代理理論指出經理人與股東間存在利益衝突，而給予經理人激勵薪被認為是解決代理問題的方法之一，過去有許多研究探討經理人激勵薪與公司經營績效表現的關係，卻少有研究從策略觀點著手─公司在進行策略選擇時，會將自身的特性與情況列入考量。因此，本研究目的為，在考慮激勵薪策略選擇的內生性後，探討經理人激勵薪比例變化對公司績效產生的影響。本研究採用處理效果模型檢驗策略選擇的內生性。研究樣本為2009年到2013年間台灣證券交易所上562間上市公司。研究結果顯示，提高經理人激勵薪比例對公司績效產生的正向效果，在考慮策略選擇的內生性後上升。而影響激勵薪策略選擇的公司特性中，十大股東持股比率與外部董事比例皆與經理人激勵薪比例變化呈負向關係，最終控制者持股比率、控制權與現金流量權比與經理人持股比率越高，公司傾向選擇增加激勵薪比例的策略。

摘要(英)

Agency theory provides a complete view on the conflict between shareholders and managers. As an application of agency theory, the incentive compensation plan for executives has been proposed to resolve this problem. Many studies have examined the effect of incentive pay on firm performance from different viewpoints. However, few studies have considered this effect from a strategic perspective. It has been suggested that firms usually
take their own attributes into account when making strategy selection. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate how the usage of incentive pay affects firm performance when considering the endogeneity of incentive pay strategies.
In this study, a treatment effects econometric model was used to exam the endogeneity of strategy. Using a sample of 562 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2013, the results showed that firm performance was much improved by the increasing strategy of the proportion of incentive pay after endogeneity was considered. Regarding corporation attributes that influence the selection of strategies, the ownership of top ten shareholders and the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors were negatively associated with the proportion of incentive pay. The ownership of ultimate controllers, ratio of control rights to cash flow rights, and manager ownership lead to a tendency of firms to select the increasing strategy of incentive pay.

關鍵字(中)

★ 經理人激勵薪
★ 公司績效
★ 內生策略選擇
★ 處理效果模型

關鍵字(英)

★ managerial incentive pay
★ firm performance
★ endogenous strategy choice
★ treatment-effect model

論文目次

ABSTRACT..................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................. v
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................ vi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................. 3
2.1 The Effect of Managerial Incentive Pay on Firm Performance .............. 3
2.2 Endogeneity of Managerial Incentive Pay.................................. 5
2.3 Determinants of Managerial Incentive Pay ................................ 6
2.3.1 Outside Directors on the Board ........................................ 6
2.3.2 Ownership Structure.................................................... 8
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ...................................................... 12
3.1 The Research Framework ................................................. 12
3.2 Specification of Data and Variables .................................... 13
3.3 Empirical Methodology .................................................. 15
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS .......................................................... 17
4.1 Descriptive Statistics ................................................. 17
4.2 Regression Results ..................................................... 20
4.3 Probit Regression Results .............................................. 21
4.4 Treatment Effects Model ................................................ 24
4.5 Discussion ............................................................. 27
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION ....................................................... 30
5.1 Conclusion and Managerial Implications ................................. 30
5.2 Limitation and Directions for Future Research .......................... 31
REFERENCES ................................................................. 32

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指導教授

陳明園

審核日期

2016-7-22

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