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姓名	王建茗(Chien-Ming Wang)  查詢紙本館藏	畢業系所	產業經濟研究所
論文名稱	(Essays on Online Auction and Fee-shifting Rule in Litigation)
相關論文	★ 雙邊市場論文集：搜尋、配對與多重據點 ★ 網路拍賣的實證研究 ★ Three Essays on the Industrial Economics ★ 畸零定價對成交機率之影響與分析 ─以 YAHOO!相機拍賣為例 ★ 雙邊市場在遊樂園及醫療市場的應用以及公營社會企業之最適民營化 ★ 網路拍賣的三個議題 ★ 領導廠商之市場進入分析-以圖形處理器市場為例
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摘要(中)	此論文主要專注於三個議題上的研究，第一篇主題為`` Optimal Listing Strategies in On-Line Auctions′′,第二篇是 ``Risk-Averse and Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation′′, 和第三篇討論的是 ``Can Partial Fee-Shifting Reduce both Litigation and Its Cost?′′. 第一篇研究是發現在網路的蓬勃發展下，eBay 應用傳統拍賣模式讓賣家藉由網路來銷售商品，然而 eBay 除了再往網路上採用傳統的拍賣（auction）銷售方式外更引入新的銷售策略，稱為暫時性的直接購買價（BIN）可以讓賣家選擇。但更進一步觀察發現，eBay 賣家也可以採用固定價格(fixed price)來銷售商品，因此三種不同的銷售方式皆存在eBay上。所以本篇文章想發展一個理論模型來解釋這樣的現象，因此我們利用賣家對於時間的耐心程度來解釋為何網路賣家會選擇不同的方式來銷售商品。本文章發現，當賣家對時間為完全有耐心時會選擇傳統的拍賣銷售方式。若是賣家存在一點時間的沒有耐心下，那賣家會採用直接購買的方式銷售商品。但若賣家沒有耐心的程度更大，大過一定的門檻後，賣家銷售商品的方法就會採用固定價格。而第二個重要的討論是，對於保留價格大小的比較，因為我們由現實資料發現，純拍賣下設定的保留價格會低於直接購買價的保留價格，而兩個保留價格皆會低於固定價格。 第二篇以及第三篇文章皆專注於民事訴訟下成本分攤的議題，第二篇最主要研究訴訟的兩造雙方對於風險險態度若為趨避的情況下，英美式訴訟成本負擔的比較。我們發現文獻上較少人討論風險態度對於成本分攤的影響，因此引發我們深入研究的興趣。本研究發現，美式規則下，風險趨避的訴訟者所願支出的成本會低於風險中立的訴訟者。但是在英式規則下，卻發現風險趨避的成本負擔相對於風險中立會加劇。所以若考慮風險態度，美式規則下的成本分攤更加凸顯其優勢，訴訟者會願意少支出訴訟費用，因此對於社會資源的浪費會降低。 第三篇考慮介於美式規則以及純英式規則間的部分負擔規則，並且討論此方式是否真能提供更好的負擔制度。文獻上發現若社會在意的是進入訴訟的數量，那麼採用純英式規則會達到最低的訴訟率。然而，相反的，若是在意的是訴訟成本的支出逞度，那應該採用美式規則，可以使訴訟成本極小。因此，有文獻提及是否可能存在一種部分負擔的制度可以平衡這兩種效果，並且優於美式以及純英式規則。而本篇研究提供了一個結果，若考慮事前期望的訴訟支出，同樣發現使得期望的訴訟支出極小的情況，只可能存在美式規則或是純英式規則，並不會得到部分負擔制度更優的情況。
摘要(英)	This dissertation explores issues on `` Optimal Listing Strategies in On-Line Auctions′′, ``Risk-Averse and Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation′′, and ``Can Partial Fee-Shifting Reduce both Litigation and Its Cost?′′. The first essay proposes a unified framework to characterize the seller′s optimal listing strategy as a function of the theirs rates of time-impatience. On-line auction provide potential sellers with a large opportunity to sell their products. Specifically, the fixed-price listing, the regular auction, and the buy-it-now auction are each a solution of the seller′s single optimization problem under different values of the relative rate of time-impatience: The perfectly patient seller adopts the regular auction when facing perfectly patient bidders; for the other cases, the sellers with medium range of time-impatience adopt the buy-it-now auctions; and the most impatient sellers adopt the fixed-price listing. Moreover, under mild conditions, the reverse price is inversely related to the value of the seller′s discount factor, either within or across formats. This in turn implies that the posted price in the fixed-price sale is greater than the reserve price of the buy-it-now auction, followed by that of the regular auction. The second essay explores a little further into the analysis of the litigation under risk-aversion. Most of the literature discuss some uncertainty in litigation, base on the simplified model and the grounds for the assumption of risk-neutral that the risk-averse behavior is rarely discussed. Therefore, this essay builds a risk-aversion model to investigate fee-shifting rule. In this essay, we adopt rent-seeking model to analyze litigation costs. Because Tullock′s model of rent-seeking has given birth to a broader set of contexts, including civil litigation. We know that, in American rule, risk-averse plaintiff and defendant have smaller litigation costs than risk-neutrality plaintiff and defendant. In the second place, based on our observation on English rule, we have good grounds for thinking that risk-averse plaintiff and defendant have larger litigation costs (rent-seeking efforts) than risk-neutrality plaintiff and defendant. More precisely, we demonstrate that American rule under risk- aversion has smallest litigation cost, and English rule under risk-aversion has most great litigation cost. The final essay relates to a considerable numbers of studies have been made on a fee-shifting rule in litigation problems. In this essay, we construct a rent-seeking model to analyze partial fee-shifting rule how affect parties′ decisions to litigate and litigation expenditures. Because the most important area of use of rent-seeking models in law probably the field of litigation. Our results provide parties reduce more litigation rates in the English rule(the loser of a lawsuit must pay all the litigation costs of the winner), but pay less litigation cost in the American rule(parties only pay their own cost). Most importantly,the American rule and the English rule have more advantages over than partial fee-shifting rule, including the expected litigation expenditures. There is no significant effect in support of the partial fee-shifting rule reducing litigation rates and costs.
關鍵字(中)	★ 網路拍賣 ★ 保留價格 ★ 訴訟費用 ★ 風險趨避 ★ 美式規則 ★ 英式規則	關鍵字(英)	★ Online-auction ★ Reserve price ★ Litigation cost ★ Risk-averse ★ American rule ★ English rule
論文目次	中文摘要........................................ I Abstract ........................................ III Content......................................... V List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VII 1 Introduction............................... 1 2 Optimal Listing Strategies in On-Line Auctions.......5 2.1 Introduction ................................ 5 2.2TheModel ................................. 10 2.2.1 TheBidder’sStrategy............................ 12 2.2.2 TheSeller’sOptimalChoice ........................ 13 2.3 ComparisonofReservePrices....................... 20 2.3.1 MainResults................................. 21 2.3.2 Intuition for the Reserve Price in the BIN Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.4 DiscussionandConclusion......................... 27 3 Risk-Averse and Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation . . . . . . . . 51 3.1 Introduction ................................ 51 3.2 model.................................... 54 3.3 The effect of risk-aversion on litigation cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.4 Conclusions................................. 61 4 Can Partial Fee-Shifting Reduce both Litigation and Its Cost? 66 4.1 Introduction ................................ 66 4.2 Model.................................... 69 4.3 Analysisofthebehaviour ......................... 70 4.4 Conclusions................................. 74
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指導教授	陳恭平(Kong-Pin Chen)	審核日期	2016-7-18
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