| 摘要(英) |
This research is based on Tournament Theory proposed by Lazear and Rosen in 1981 .We comfirm that Tournament Theory actaully exist in the salary structure of Chinese enterprises. Tournament Theory indicates that the further expanding pay gap in the organization will bring even better corporate performance. Not only do we investigate whether pay gap between company managers has positive influence on Corporate Performance, but also Corporate Performance has positive effect on pay gap between company managers.Futher more, we intend to discover the main factors affecting pay gap between company managers and the main factors having great influnce on Corporate Performance.
In this study, we take Chinese enterprises in Shenzhen stock market from 2011 to 2014 as research objects, and include 462 companies in 2011, 468 companies in 2012, 471 companies in 2013, 467 companies in 2014. We take 1,868 companies including 11,554 observations in four years as research objects. Those observations are divided into traditional industries and high-tech industries.
In this research, we have the five kinds of pay gap between employee, which include the pay gap between individual vice-general-manager and general manager, the pay gap between average employee and general manager, the pay gap between individual vice-general-manager and average employee, the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and average employee, the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and general manager.
We look forward to understanding the relationship between the five kinds of pay gap and corporate performance by simple linear regression method. Respectively, we discover the main factors which affect pay gap between company managers and those which have great effect on corporate performance.
Among mainly affecting pay gap factors, empirical results show that company performance has a positively significant influence on pay gap; the level of inner-company competition has a positively significant effect on pay gap; Those classified to high-tech industries have larger influence on pay gap than those classified to tradotional indusries; The total employee number of a company has a positively significant effect on pay gap.
Among dominantly affecting Corporate Performance factors, empirical results show that pay gap between company managers has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance; The total employee number of a company has a positively significant effect on Corporate Performance; The asset of a company has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance; The total number of a company`s employee has a positively significant effect on Corporate Performance; Average return of asset on industry has a positively significant influence on Corporate Performance, but debt-asset ratio and R&D expenses ratio of a company both have negatively significant influence on Corporate Performance.
Finally, empirical results suggest that the pay gap between average vice-general-manager and employee payment has the largest effect on Corporate Performance among all pay gaps. |
| 參考文獻 |
1. 中文部分
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