家族企業與經理人短視近利問題探討

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姓名

陳品宏(Ping-Hung Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

家族企業與經理人短視近利問題探討
(Family Firms and CEO Career Horizon problems)

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摘要(中)

以往企業都會因為所有權與經營權分離，股東與經理人目的不同，而有代理問題
產生，本研究主要探討的議題：經理人短視近利問題(CEO career horizon problem)
也是代理問題的一類，本研究使用社會情感財富(Socioemotional Wealth，簡稱 SEW)
為架構去探討企業是否會為了保護 SEW 而減少經理人短視近利問題的發生？除此之
外，本研究也根據家族企業成立過程，把家族企業成立過程分為兩類，一種是由家族
成員自己創立，另一種是併購其它企業的家族企業，最後，本研究探討家族企業中第
幾代經營領導的家族企業績效會較好，研究發現，原創的家族企業和第一代經營者領
導的家族企業績效會較好。

摘要(英)

In the past , there are agency problems , because of separation of ownership and
management . the main topics in this study: CEO career horizon problem is also a kind of
agency problems . This research use socioemotional wealth as theoretical framework to consider
that whether firms will reduce the CEO career horizon problems in order to protect SEW .
Besides , this study also explores the establishment of family business process . The establishment
of family firm is divided into two cases, one is created by the family members themselves, the
other is the family firm which acquired by families . Finally , this study explores what generations
in the family firms will lead to a better performance . The study found that there are better
performance in original family firms and the family firms which lead by first generation .

關鍵字(中)

★ 家族企業
★ 社會情感財富
★ 經理人短視近利問題

關鍵字(英)

★ family firms
★ socioemotional wealth
★ CEO career horizon problems

論文目次

目錄
摘要 ..................................................................... i
Abstract ................................................................ ii
目錄 ................................................................... iii
表目錄 .................................................................. iv
第一章緒論 .............................................................. 1
1-1 研究動機與目的.................................................... 1
1-2 研究貢獻.......................................................... 3
第二章文獻探討 .......................................................... 4
2-1 家族企業.......................................................... 4
2-2 家族企業與代理問題................................................ 5
2-3 家族企業與經理人短視近利問題(CEO career horizon problem) .......... 7
2-4 家族企業與社會情感財富(SEW) ....................................... 8
第三章假說發展 ......................................................... 11
第四章研究方法 ......................................................... 14
4-1 研究期間與資料來源............................................... 14
4-2 實證模型與變數定義............................................... 14
第五章：實證結果 ........................................................ 20
5-1 敘述性統計與相關分析............................................. 20
5-2 迴歸分析......................................................... 28
第六章：結論與建議 ...................................................... 39
6-1 研究結論......................................................... 39
6-2 研究限制與建議................................................... 41
參考文獻： .............................................................. 42

參考文獻

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指導教授

曹壽民(Shou-Min Tsao)

審核日期

2017-6-26

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