博碩士論文 107429002 詳細資訊




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姓名 李軒(Hsuan Lee)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 經濟學系
論文名稱
(A model of instituion design-How bank bailout policy affect ex-ante incentive)
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摘要(中) 在2008 年金融海嘯中我觀察到如雷曼兄弟等"Too big to failed"的大型金融機構即使
在危機發生時仍然有恃無恐,繼續進行一些高槓桿的投資,因為他們相信即使倒閉政
府也會因為會產生很大的系統性風險而出手救助。本文旨在探討如何設計一套事後的
救助政策來影響"Too big to failed"的大型金融機構事前的投資。
摘要(英) In the 2008 financial crisis, I observe those so-called“too big to failed"financial
institutions such as lehman brothers still engage in highly risky investments after
the crisis happened. They believe that if they go bankrupt the government will
bail them out no matter what. And they can still engage in those high leverage
investment because even if the investment failed, the government will still save them
by letting taxpayers bear the consequences. In this paper, we discuss how ex-ante
“too big to failed"problems and the ex-post dishonest of the bankruptcy will affect
social welfare. We are on the side of the government to design the bailout policy
trying to minimize the inefficiency caused by asymmetric information.
關鍵字(中) ★ 金融危機
★ 救助政策
★ 太大不能倒
關鍵字(英) ★ Too big to failed
★ bailout policy
★ institution design
★ financial crisis
論文目次 1 Introduction 1
2 Model 2
2.1 Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4 The Tough Bailout policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5 The Soft Bailout Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6 The In-Between Bailout Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.7 The efficiency comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.8 The Mixed Bailout Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Conclusion 12
Reference 13
參考文獻 [1] Aghion, P., Bolton, P., Fries, S.,1999 ”Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case
of Transition Economies” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155,
51-70.
[2] Cordella, T., Yeyati, E.L., 2003. Bank bailouts: Moral hazard vs. value effect. J.
Finan. Intermediation 12, 300–330.
[3] Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole. 1994. The prudential regulation of banks. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press. Fabozzi, F., and A. Konishi. 1991. Asset liability management.
Chicago: Probus.
13
指導教授 鄭浩祥(Ho-Cheung Cheng) 審核日期 2020-7-2
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