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姓名	周秉苙(Ping-Li Chou)  查詢紙本館藏	畢業系所	產業經濟研究所
論文名稱	中間財廠商的企業社會責任與最適汙染稅 (Intermediate Goods Firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility and Optimal Pollution Tax)
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摘要(中)	在生產中間財的過程中產生汙染是很常見的，因此本文欲探討當中間財廠商具有企業社會責任時，對最適汙染稅政策以及國內社會福利的影響。本文假設本國最終財市場上有一國內廠商及國外廠商，同時也存在兩家上游中間財廠商供應本國最終財廠商所需，一間為具有企業社會責任的廠商，一間為傳統追求利潤極大廠商。 結果發現，當上游中間財廠商具有企業社會責任時，會使最適汙染稅下降，然而也會使中間財的總產量減少，進而導致最終財總產量的減少、價格上升，造成本國最終財廠商及消費者的損失，且外國廠商利潤增加。上游廠商的企業社會責任程度較高時，會造成最適汙染稅的下降，不過會讓另一家中間財廠商會多生產。在國內環境損害較高的假設下，ECSR廠商關心環境損害程度程度較高時，也會造就較高的福利。 本文也比對了本國廠商垂直整合下的最適汙染稅。在本國最終財廠商的生產成本大於外國廠商生產成本的情況下，本國廠商垂直整合下的最適汙染稅高於存在中間財廠商的最適汙染稅，其原因有二，一為中間財廠商實施了CSR因此總汙染量會較低，造成較低的最適汙染稅，二為由於中間財市場以及最終財市場都是寡占市場，因此政府會課徵較低的汙染稅導正市場的不完整性。另外，兩個模型在最適汙染稅下的環境損害是相等的，也就是最佳社會福利狀態。因此我們發現，在最適汙染稅下ECSR廠商關心環境損害程度上升時，社會福利不一定會上升。在最適汙染稅下，中間財廠商模型的社會福利比垂直整合廠商模型的社會福利還要小。 本文提出了許多企業具有CSR所帶來的好處，像是降低環境損害，提升社會福利，若政府能大力推廣，使得更多企業願意從事CSR的話，或許能改善政府課徵汙染稅所遇到的困境。
摘要(英)	In this dissertation, we analyze the optimal pollution tax when the firm pays attention to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) when the government taxation for environment. Assume there are two firms in the final goods market, one is from home country, and the other from foreign country. There are two firms in the intermediate goods market, one is Environment Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) firm, and the other is profit-maximizing firm. We show the more ECSR firm pays attention to CSR, the lower the optimal pollution tax, but the lower intermediate goods and final goods. Reduction of final goods make final goods firms’ profit and consumer surplus decrease, but foreign firm’s profit increases. When The more ECSR firm pay attention to CSR, the other firms earn more profit in the market. We show the the vertically integrated firms model in this dissertation. When the home country firm’s cost more than foreign country firm’s cost, the optimal pollution tax in the intermediate goods model lower than in the vertically integrated firms model. For one thing, the more ECSR firm pay attention to CSR, the lower pollution in the country. For another, government will subsidy intermediate good firms to fix market incomplete problem. When government take optimal pollution tax, the more ECSR firm pays attention to CSR, social welfare not necessarily bigger. When government take optimal pollution tax, social welfare in intermediate good firms model smaller than social welfare in vertically integrated firms model. We introduce many advantage of CSR, like reducing pollution, increasing social welfare. If the government can conduct the firms to CSR activities, it will be able to make up the difficulty of government pollution tax.
關鍵字(中)	★ 企業社會責任 ★ 汙染稅 ★ 中間財	關鍵字(英)	★ corporate social responsibility ★ pollution tax ★ intermediate goods
論文目次	摘　要………………………………………………………………….....i Abstract…………………………………………………………………ii 誌 謝…………………………………………………………………...iii 目　錄…………………………………………………………………...iv 第一章　前言……………………………………………………………1 第一節　研究動機與目的…………………………………………1 第二節　研究方法…………………………………………………4 第三節　研究架構…………………………………………………5 第二章　文獻回顧………………………………………………………6 第三章　基本模型……………………………………………………..10 第一節　市場競爭分析…………………………………………..10 第二節　最適汙染稅的訂定……………………………………..12 第四章　中間財市場與最適汙染稅…………………………………..16 第一節　市場競爭分析…………………………………………..16 第二節　最適汙染稅的訂定……………………………………..23 第三節　最適汙染稅的比較……………………………………..28 第五章　結論…………………………………………………………..31 參考文獻………………………………………………………………..33
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指導教授	邱俊榮 蔡偉德(Jiunn-Rong Chiou Wei-Der Tsai)	審核日期	2021-7-5
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