管理層變動限制與企業社會責任

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姓名

陳芝涵(Chih-Han Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

管理層變動限制與企業社會責任

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至系統瀏覽論文 (2026-6-30以後開放)

摘要(中)

Akins, De Angelis, & Gaulin(2020)所創立的變數「管理層變動限制(Change of management restrictions, CMRs)」給予貸方明確的借方公司經理人去留的控制權，借方公司藉由使用管理層變動限制貸款合約可以有效降低經理人的替換風險，對公司治理有正向的影響。本研究以 KLD 資料庫來計算企業社會責任表現，衡量管理層變動限制對企業社會責任表現的影響，此外進一步探討使用管理層變動限制貸款條約同時也有企業社會責任環境項目評分的公司對公司價值的影響，實證結果顯示，使用管理層變動限制的公司，其企業社會責任表現較好，但有使用管理層變動限制貸款條約同時也有企業社會責任環境項目評分的公司，其公司價值卻顯著下降，透過分析其對營業支出與對信用評等分數的關聯，推測有使用管理層變動限制貸款條約同時也有企業社會責任環境項目評分的公司，想要透過增加營業支出，以漂綠來操弄相關利益者的想法，但信用評等機構並沒有受到影響，因此依舊給其較低的信用評等分數。

摘要(英)

Akins, De Angelis, and Gaulin (2020) created a variable "Change of Management Restrictions, CMRS" which gives the creditor company the right to control the position of debit company manager. The debit company which utilized loan contracts with Change of Management Restrictions can effectively reduce the replacement risk of managers and have a forward impact on corporate governance. This study uses the KLD database to calculate the performance of corporate social responsibility, measuring the impact of Change of Management Restrictions on corporate social responsibility. In addition, examine the influence of the company with both Change of Management Restrictions and KLD environment scores to the firm value. The empirical results show that the company uses Change of Management Restrictions, its corporate social responsibility score is better. However, there are some companies that use Change of Management Restrictions with KLD environment scores, their companies’ value decreased but their companies’ Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses increased significantly. These companies would like to use green-washing to manipulate stakeholders, credit evaluation organizations, but it didn’t work. The credit evaluation organization still gave these companies lower scores.

關鍵字(中)

★ 管理層變動限制
★ 企業社會責任
★ 漂綠

關鍵字(英)

★ Change of Management Restrictions
★ Corporate Social Responsibility
★ Green- washing

論文目次

第一章緒論 1
第二章文獻探討 4
第一節債權人與公司治理的關聯性 4
第二節人力資本與債務能力的關聯性 5
第三節債務人與企業社會責任表現的關聯 6
第四節信用評等與企業社會責任表現的關聯性 7
第五節企業社會責任與綠色清理的關聯性 8
第三章研究樣本與方法 9
第一節研究樣本與變數定義 9
第二節研究方法與假說 13
第四章實證結果 14
第一節敘述性統計 14
第二節實證模型回歸與穩健性檢測 20
第三節更多研究 33
第五章研究結論 41

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指導教授

彭淑卿(Shu-Cing Peng)

審核日期

2021-5-31

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