金融危機時期的薪酬變化與公司績效之關係 —以2008金融危機為例

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姓名

蔣孟儒(Meng-Ju Chiang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

金融危機時期的薪酬變化與公司績效之關係 —以2008金融危機為例

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至系統瀏覽論文 (2026-1-1以後開放)

摘要(中)

本研究欲探討高階主管薪酬與公司績效之間，在金融危機發生時的關係，針對台灣上市櫃公司做實證研究。學術上，高階主管薪酬與公司績效關係的理論，分為兩派學說，分別是正向關係與沒有關係。然而，大多數學者認為兩主之間為正向關係，但這些研究的樣本期間皆為經濟景氣好的時候，因此，本研究將著重在當金融危機發生時，即探討景氣不好的時候，兩者之間的關係是否會產生變化。本研究以2008年之金融危機為事件，且採用股票報酬率作為公司績效之變數，透過分樣本分析可以發現，高階主管總薪酬變化與公司績效，在金融危機前、金融危機時與金融危機後，皆不呈現顯著關係；然而，薪酬結構變化與公司績效，在金融危機發生時，會產生正向顯著的關係，提高現金薪酬占總薪酬比例（降低權益薪酬占總薪酬比例）會使公司後一年之股價表現提升，但在金融危機前後，則沒有呈現任何關係。本研究進一步探討提高現金薪酬比例使公司績效變好的原因，所以探討現今薪酬比例與公司投資效率之間的關係，結果可以發現，提高現金薪酬占總薪酬比例（降低權益薪酬占總薪酬比例）可以提升公司投資效率。因此，推論當金融危機發生時，提高現金薪酬比例（降低權益薪酬比例）會產生短期激勵效果，使公司投資效率提升，進而使股價表現增加。

摘要(英)

This paper focuses on the relationship between the executive compensation and the firm performance of the listed companies in Taiwan in the financial crisis. Theoretically, there are two theories about executive compensation and firm performance. One is positive, and the other is negative. Most studies found that there is positive relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, but the sample periods of those studies are all in the times with good economy. Hence, I test whether the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance affected by the financial crisis which the economy is worse. This paper concentrates on 2008 financial crisis, and uses the stock return to measure the firm performance. The results show that there is no relationship between total executive compensation and the firm performance before, during and after the financial crisis. However, there is a positive relationship between the structure of the executive compensation and the firm performance during the financial crisis. Increasing the proportion of the cash compensation in total compensation (Decreasing the proportion of the equity compensation in total compensation) would enhance the stock performance. Nonetheless, the relationship between the structure of the executive compensation and the firm performance before and after the financial crisis is not obvious. Furthermore, I test the relationship between the executive compensation and the investment efficiency to find out the reason that increasing the proportion of the cash compensation could enhance the stock performance. The results demonstrate that increasing the proportion of the cash compensation in total compensation (Decreasing the proportion of the equity compensation in total compensation) would enhance the investment efficiency. Therefore, I think there is a short-term incentive effect due to increasing the proportion of cash compensation (decreasing the proportion of equity compensation). Accordingly, the investment efficiency would be enhanced, and the firm performance would be better.

關鍵字(中)

★ 高階主管薪酬
★ 公司績效
★ 金融危機
★ 投資效率

關鍵字(英)

★ Executive compensation
★ firm performance
★ financial crisis
★ investment efficiency

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 v
一、緒論 1
1-1 前言 1
二、文獻回顧與假說建立 4
2-1 薪酬理論 4
2-2 高階主管薪酬與公司績效的關係 4
2-3 薪酬結構設計之效果 5
2-4 金融危機時薪酬與公司績效關係 5
2-5 假說建立 6
三、研究方法 8
3-1 實證方法與模型設定 8
3-2 樣本選取 8
3-3 變數定義與資料來源 9
3-4 敘述統計量 12
3-5 相關係數表 14
四、實證結果 15
4-1 高階主管總薪酬變化與公司股價表現關係 15
4-2 薪酬結構變化與公司股價表現關係 17
五、穩健性測試 19
5-1 參考Lins, Servaes et al. (2017)的模型 19
5-2 公司治理對公司績效的影響 21
六、投資效率 26
6-1 投資效率 26
6-2 投資效率與總薪酬變化關係 27
6-3 投資效率與薪酬結構變化關係 29
6-4 穩健性測試 31
七、研究結論與後續延伸建議 33
附錄 34
參考文獻 36

參考文獻

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指導教授

彭淑卿(Shu-Cing Peng)

審核日期

2021-7-1

推文