公司治理、創新與公司經營績效：台灣電子業之實證研究

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黃于恬(Yu-Tien Huang) 查詢紙本館藏

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公司治理、創新與公司經營績效：台灣電子業之實證研究

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摘要(中)

本文運用台灣上市櫃電子業公司的數據，研究公司治理、企業創新與經營績效三者之間的關係。文中利用網絡差額變數模型（Network slack-based model, SBM）估計企業創新活動的效率，並將其分為研發與行銷兩個子階段。實證結果發現，行銷效率對於經營績效有積極的影響，並且中介了「機構法人持股與資產報酬率」以及「經理人持股與Tobin′s Q 」之間的關係。法人持股與行銷效率以及資產報酬率皆存在正向關係，代表法人持股會透過促進行銷效率，對公司財務績效有更進一步的正面影響。另一方面，經理人持股與 Tobin′s Q 存在負向關係，而與行銷效率則存在正向關係，經理人持股也會透過行銷效率的渠道對公司價值有積極的影響，略微減緩因管理者持股比例過高所產生的代理問題。
另外，本文也驗證了股權結構與經營績效之間的非線性關係：大股東持股與Tobin’s Q 存在「倒Ｕ型曲線」關係，代表大股東持股比例愈高，經營績效愈好，但在超過一半（約為52.63%）的股權集中於少數股東手中時，反而不利於公司的市場價值。經理人持股與 ROA 則存在「Ｕ型曲線」關係，當經理人持有更多股權時，對於經營績效有消極的影響，然而當其持股率高達約為 31.27% 以上時，反而會轉為正面的影響。

摘要(英)

This paper investigates the relationship among corporate governance, firm innovation, and firm performance using data from Taiwanese listed electronics companies. The firm-level innovation efficiency is estimated by the network slack-based model (SBM) and divided into two sub-stages: R&D and marketing. The results show that marketing efficiency has a positive effect on firm performance and mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and ROA as well as managers’ ownership and Tobin′s Q. There is a positive correlation between institutional ownership and marketing efficiency as well as ROA, which means that institutional ownership has a further positive impact on financial performance by promoting marketing efficiency. On the other hand, managers’ ownership has a negative impact on Tobin′s Q while a positive impact on marketing efficiency. Managers’ ownership also has a positive impact on firm value through the channel of marketing efficiency and slightly mitigates the agency problems.
Apart from this, this paper also verifies the non-linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. First, there is an "inverted U-shaped" curve relationship between large shareholders’ ownership and Tobin′s Q, which means that the higher percentage of large shareholders’ ownership will have better performance. However, when more than half (52.63%) of the shareholding is concentrated in the hands of minority shareholders, it is detrimental to the firm value. Second, there is a "U-shaped" curve relationship between managers’ ownership and ROA. When managers hold more shares, it has a negative impact on the firm performance. However, when their shareholding is above 31.27%, the impact has turned positive.

關鍵字(中)

★ 股權結構
★ 創新效率
★ 經營績效
★ 中介效果
★ SBM 模型

關鍵字(英)

★ Ownership structure
★ Innovation efficiency
★ Firm performance
★ Mediating effect

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第一章緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的與架構 3
第二章文獻回顧 5
2.1 公司治理與經營績效 5
2.2 公司治理與創新效率 8
2.3 創新效率與公司經營績效 9
第三章資料來源與變數說明 11
3.1 資料來源 11
3.2 變數之操作型定義與說明 12
一、公司經營績效變數（Performance） 12
二、公司治理變數（Governance） 12
三、創新效率變數（Innovation）以及投入與產出 15
四、控制變數（Control） 16
第四章研究方法 20
4.1 創新效率之衡量 20
4.2 用網絡 SBM 模型衡量創新效率 22
4.3 迴歸模型 24
4.4 差分一般化動差估計法（differential GMM） 27
第五章實證結果與分析 28
5.1 敘述統計表 28
5.2 Pearson相關係數分析 28
5.3 公司治理與經營績效之關聯性 32
5.4 公司治理與創新效率之關聯性 35
5.5 創新效率與公司經營績效之關聯性 37
5.6 公司治理、創新效率與經營績效創新效率的中介（Mediating）效果 39
5.7 公司治理、創新效率與經營績效創新效率的調節（Moderating）效果 42
5.8 股權結構與公司經營績效之非線性關係 42
第六章結論與研究限制 46
6.1 結論 46
6.2 研究限制與建議 47
參考文獻 48
附錄一網絡差額變數模型(Network SBM model) 52

參考文獻

中文文獻
1. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩 (2002)，公司治理與評等系統，初版，商智文化，臺北。

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指導教授

蔡明宏蔡栢昇

審核日期

2022-8-29

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