恐怖攻擊、經理人管理能力與經理人薪酬

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姓名

林婕儒(Chieh-ju Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

恐怖攻擊、經理人管理能力與經理人薪酬
(Terrorist attacks, managerial ability, and CEO compensation)

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摘要(中)

本研究探討經理人恐怖攻擊經歷以及管理能力相互作用對經理人薪酬的影響。恐怖攻擊的威脅日益影響社會和商業運作，為企業經理人帶來複雜挑戰。本研究通過研究 1992 年至 2016 年間美國的恐怖襲擊樣本，發現經理人恐怖攻擊經歷與總體經營能力的相互作用與經理人薪酬之間存在顯著正向關係。在受恐怖襲擊影響的公司中，被歸類為總體經營者（Generalists）的經理人在襲擊後平均獲得了17.35% 的額外年報酬。薪酬的組成也發生了變化，具有較高經營能力的經理人似乎獲得了在薪酬、現金支付、期權價值、長期績效計畫價值和股權支付方面的額外獎勵。然而，在經理人恐怖攻擊經歷與總體經營能力之間的關係對風險激勵和薪酬對企業績效的敏感性方面，我們未找到具有統計學意義的結果。本研究填補了文獻中在探討恐怖襲擊、經理人總體經營能力和薪酬之間的綜合影響方面的探討，且本文研究結果提供了關於在危機期間如何對待和激勵經理人的洞察。

關鍵字：恐怖攻擊、經理人薪資、管理能力

摘要(英)

This study examines the interrelation between terrorist attacks, CEO general managerial ability, and executive compensation. The threat of terrorist attacks has increasingly impacted society and business operations, leading to complex challenges for corporate executives. Using a sample of terrorist attacks in the U.S. from 1992 to 2016, the results show a significant positive relationship between the interaction of terrorist attacks and general managerial ability with CEO pay. CEOs classified as generalists working at firms affected by terrorist attacks earn a post-attack premium of 17.35%. The composition of compensation also changes, CEOs with higher level of general managerial skills seem to receive premium on executive’s Salary, Cash Pay, Option Value, LTIP Value, and Equity Pay. While we did not find statistically significant result in the terrorist attack combined with CEO general managerial ability influences on CEO pay sensitivity. This research fills a gap in the literature by exploring the combined impact of terrorist attacks, CEO general managerial ability, and compensation. The findings provide insights how CEOs are rewarded and incentivized during crises.

Keywords: Terrorist Attacks, General Managerial Ability, CEO Compensation

關鍵字(中)

★ 恐怖攻擊
★ 經理人薪資
★ 管理能力

關鍵字(英)

★ Terrorist Attacks
★ General Managerial Ability
★ CEO Compensation

論文目次

Table of Contents
摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Tables v
1. Introduction - 1 -
2. Literature review and hypotheses’ development - 4 -
2.1 The impact of terror attacks on CEO compensation - 4 -
2.2 The impact of general managerial ability on CEO compensation - 6 -
2.3 The interrelation between the impact of negative events and general managerial ability - 7 -
3. Sample selection and Methodology - 10 -
3.1 Independent variables - 10 -
3.2 Dependent variables and control variables - 11 -
3.3 Regression Model - 12 -
4. Empirical results - 14 -
4.1 Descriptive statistics - 14 -
4.2 Effect of terrorist attacks and general managerial ability on executive compensation levels - 14 -
4.3 Effects of CEO general managerial ability and terror attacks on the composition of compensation - 16 -
4.4 Effects of CEO general managerial ability and terror attacks on Vega and Delta - 17 -
4.5 Alternative measures of attack proximity and CEO compensation - 18 -
5. Conclusion - 19 -
References - 21 -
Appendix - 34 -

參考文獻

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指導教授

李韋憲(Wei-Hsien Li)

審核日期

2023-7-20

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