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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/4353

    Authors: 連育平;Lien-Yu Ping
    Contributors: 中國文學研究所
    Keywords: ;性情;李翱;唐代儒學;復性
    Date: 2008-05-26
    Issue Date: 2009-09-22 09:17:17 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: 唐代於學術思潮的發展,一般被認為是佛道大盛而儒學沒落的時代,但宋代開始,儒家欲探討的幾個重要課題,諸如:天人關係,心性問題,《大學》的格物致知,《易傳》的無思無為、動靜寂感,成聖的根據及工夫次第……等等,在唐代已有其不能忽視的轉折,為宋明兩代儒學思想的復興做了準備和開端,而李翱即是在有唐一代的儒者中,被認為能承前啟後,為宋明理學攻下前哨的思想家。 本論藉由學術史以及思想史兩個方面,來討論李翱的生平經歷與學說內涵。由其生平的經歷可知,李翱的思想並非受到梁肅、韓愈、惟儼禪師等人深刻的影響而產生,其實自有其對儒家學說,跨越時代的解讀和發明。 另外,藉由對李翱所有文獻的研究,筆者認為只要能理解李翱思想中「性」、「心」、「情」、「邪妄」四者的關係,李翱的學說便有解通的可能。李翱所認為的性,乃是一從天下貫而來的天命之性,具有至「善」且「靜」的本質,做為心與情的根據而存在。心則為人的道德主體,能「知」、能「思」、能「覺」,可以做出道德的價值判斷與抉擇,使人自發自覺的為善。情則能顯明本性和與外物接感,具有「動」與「可善可不善」的本質,在接感外物的過程中,則有動而為正或為邪的區分,就其結果的表現看,也有善與不善的不同。「邪妄」則無所因,沒有任何根據,故可以被完全消滅。當外物來時,若放肆其心之所為,讓心受到外物的影響與牽動,情就會動而為邪,本性即被昏蔽,邪妄即由此而生,在人的行動上表現出不善,反之,若能使心不受到動搖,情就會動而為正,朗現本性,邪妄就能被完全消滅,人的一切言行舉止即能表現出善,並且合於天道,成為能盡性命之道的聖人。心能不受外物牽動,持續保持不動盪的狀態,人即能為善而終至聖人之境,由此可知,心即是李翱工夫修養的用力處。 本論透過對李翱個人的生平經歷和其思想中天人觀、性情論、工夫論的分項討論,疏解李翱學說中的疑點,為李翱的思想體系,給出一可以前後一貫的解釋。 Together with Han Yu (768-824), Li Ao (774-836) was a major forefunner of the Neo-Confuicanism that later developed in Sung Dynasty. He was well-known for his doctrine of feelings. Traditionally, this has been identified as a result of the influences from Buddhisma nd Taoism. This thesis will, first of all, show that there is no evidence for such a connection. In particular, that he was decisively influenced by the Buddhist monks such as Wei Yen and Tao Tung is purely fictional. Neither was Li’s doctrine produced through his interaction with his contemporary literates. Rather, he developed his own understanding of Confucianism in terms of self-enlightenment. Secondly, this thesis will demonstrate that Li’s doctrine of feelings consists of the four concepts: hsing (Nature), hsin (Mind), ching (feeling), and hsieh-wang (the depraved). Generally, it will argue that only starting with a clarification of these major concepts that one can correctly understand Li’s doctrine of feelings, and hence dissolve its apparent self-contradictions. In particular, it will show that hsing (Nature) is what is granted from Heaven, while hsin (Mind) signifies the moral subjectivity. Further, ching (feeling) is the mainfestation of hsing (Nature), whereas hsieh-wang (the depraved) only results from losing one’s mind into the external world of things. As a consequence, he developed a theory of moral praxis according to which when hsin (Mind) is not affected by any external objects, ching (feelings) would become rectified. And only those who can rectify their feelings are able to become sages. This will give rise to a systematic interpretation of the whole doctrine of Li Ao.
    Appears in Collections:[中國文學研究所] 博碩士論文

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