本文以女性主義視角，即自由女性主義與關懷倫理學之論點為出發點，以探討母胎關係與墮胎。在墮胎爭議中，母胎關係是重要關鍵，然現有墮胎論據中對母胎關係著墨不多且未做出正確陳述。而自由女性主義承襲了自由主義的思想，主張女性有控制自己身體的權利。因此，女性主義強調應尊重孕婦本身的身體自主權，不管懷孕的原因為何，女性都有絕對權利選擇墮胎與否。然自由女性主義在母胎關係上，認為母胎為兩個獨立的生命體，是以兩者有權利衝突時，母親的自律權大於胎兒的生命權。但這種母胎關係的分析取向實不符合我們平常的道德經驗，故無法充分說明墮胎的道德性。 而關懷倫理學強調從關係中建立義務，以關係之確立來決定母親和胎兒之間的權利義務。在母胎關係上，把母親和胎兒看成一單一生命體，在此模型中，並沒有真正母胎衝突的問題存在，是以母親的情感乃成為義務的唯一判準。但將母胎的權利義務完全訴諸於母親對胎兒情感的認同，也難保證母親的行為都是合乎道德的，這種母胎關係的分析取向也無法與我們的道德情感相應。 本文接著論述西茂爾的三種母胎關係，得到「非一非二」不可分的母胎關係，最符合我們的道德經驗。在母胎關係上，儒家認同母胎關係是一種「非一非二」不可分的連結關係。最後本文提出，儒家倫理的母胎關係，加上儒家的道德人格和社會人格觀點下，得到非一非二之墮胎新視野。在此觀點下墮胎爭議或許可得到一些紓解。 This essay looks at the maternal-fetal relationship and abortion, first, from the feminist, that is, liberal feminist and care ethics point of view. In abortion, the key relation is what between the mother and the fetus, however, this relation is not always the focus of abortion discussion and no correct description is readily available. Liberal feminist follows the basic ideas of liberalism and emphasize that woman has the right to control the use of her body. Therefore, liberal feminists stress that we should respect the right of woman for the use of her body and that woman has the absolute right to choose to abort or not, no matter what causes the pregnancy. They regard the mother and the fetus as two independent entities and in case of conflict, the autonomy of the mother overrides the right to life of the fetus. However, this view of maternal-fetal relationship is not quite fit into our common moral experience and thus could not justify the morality of abortion. Care ethics establishes duty from relationship and tries to define the duty of the mother and fetus in terms of relation. If we take maternal-fetal relation as one between a single living entity to itself, there would be no real maternal-fetal conflict at all and the criterion of duty relies solely on the feeling that the mother has towards the fetus. Basing the maternal-fetal rights and duties completely upon the identity of mother’s feelings towards the fetus could not guarantee the acts of the mother are always moral. Such conception of maternal-fetal relationship is not up to our moral feeling. Seymour proposes three sorts of maternal-fetal relationship, and his not-one-and-not-two maternal-fetal relationship is the one that conform best to our moral experience. Confucian would take the maternal-fetal relationship as a not-one-and-not-two model. I conclude finally that the Confucian conception of maternal-fetal relationship, together with Confucian conceptions of moral personhood and social personhood, would give a new horizon on abortion, and that some of the controversies could be resolved.
