萬曆四十六年四月（1618）女真人建立的後金國麾軍進攻明帝國位於遼東的前線邊防要地—撫順城—，揭開了明清戰爭的序幕。為因應戰事，明廷自中央派遣官員，以兵部堂官兼都察院憲職、出任「遼東經略」一職，肩負起作戰總指揮的責任。遼東地方原本已設置有巡撫，同時也遙隸於薊遼總督，督撫二臣的職責包括提轄軍隊作戰；然而面對後金的侵攻，明廷不思強化既有駐外大臣的職能，而是另行委派事畢則罷的遼東經略。作為文官和特命欽差，遼東經略的這兩個本質分別反應了明帝國在軍事領導上採取以文馭武，和以權柄不集中於一人，以防範臣下威脅到皇權的存在。 從遼東經略制度的發展，可以看到文官體系對於軍隊的掌控在晚明時發展到極致，國家武力由文官在獲得皇帝授權的前提下進行操控。然而朝廷用人而不使之專，使得各相關官員往往人各為政、形成多頭馬車的領導態勢，甚至彼此相爭，致使指揮混亂。儘管如此，當遼東經略廢置後明帝國仍舊堅持同樣的原則，並未稍加更張。就皇權的穩固而言，這樣的作法確實收得效果，然而其代價卻是文官間一但彼此相爭不下，在軍務的處理上便陷入無謂的內耗，甚至影響到戰爭的成敗。遼東經略制度在明清戰爭中的種種，正是例證。 本研究以實錄、奏議、方志、文集、筆記做為骨幹史料，盡可能勾勒出遼東經略制度的淵源與始末，透過對其運作實況的描繪，捕捉明清戰爭前期遼東經略制度背後所蘊藏的精神。 In 1618 summer, Jurchens attacked Fu-Shun, a fortress of Ming Empire in Liao-Tung. This event started the war between Late Jin and Ming. For this war, Ming court sent an imperial inspectors by the central government, named “Liao-Tung ching-lüen”(遼東經略) with major military duties. In late Ming period, there were already had governors (Liao-Tung hsün-fu) and supreme commanders (Chi-Liao ts'ung-tu) in Liao-Tung, but the court did not let them lead troops to fight with Jurchens. Instead, the court sent another official to command the troops. By studying the development of the post of Liao-Tung ching-lüen, we can find that if the emperor gives the authority to bureaucracy, then the civil service could control the national army. However, it always put into practice by collective leadership. That means there was no official could make decisions without colleagues’ endorsement. Such pattern made the emperor’s power cannot be challenged, if the officials who command army disputed for strategy, the emperor would be the highest arbiter. Although the emperor could make sure he is the highest authority in this pattern, it may also bring a bad effect. If there was heavy conflicts and confrontation, which didn’t compromise immediately and successfully between officials and emperor, the collective leadership would go into chaos. Unfortunately, it happened in late Ming Empire and caused they fail in the war against Jurchen’s invasion.
