| 摘要: | 杜畢費的繪畫中存在著一種發人困惑的表現。這些去除任何筆繪線條、乃 至於將手所介入的痕跡降至最低的非具像作品名為：『肌理學』、『地形學』、『現 象』與『物質學』。此四個系列可由藝術家的創作意念與過程、及作品強烈的指 涉性而界定為非抽象的再現。因此，畫布上的顏料或媒材，例如紙漿、銀紙等， 並不扮演形式元素的角色，而顯現為物質的自發性組成，並在觀看中傳達類似 逼真的幻覺經驗。然而，此幻象的形成卻沒有遵循媒介的透明化原則，而是伴 隨媒材物質性的必然在場。本論文的目的即在探討，以媒介在場為前提的再現， 其知覺將如何發生作用。 肌理表面突顯媒介在場並促成作品的曖昧性，一方面使得本論文的探討範 圍擴大為橫亙整個五０年代作品，因而不限於上述四個系列，另一方面，則顯 示一般側重於從圖象解讀作品多義性的再現理論，並不能滿足這項曖昧特質， 充其量只能解釋一部份原因。在這裡，沙特的「感知意識」與「圖像意識」彌 補了認識論再現的不足。對同一對象所採取的不同意識態度，說明杜畢費許多 作品在主題與內含上之所以兩相出入，不是基於一種再現上的不正確、或貢布 里希「投射機制」的失靈，而是藝術家同時操作兩種知覺意識，造成觀看上的 迷走。 從貢布里希圖畫再現的心理學原理「製作— 比對」切入，到援用現象學的 方法：以不同的意識模式來研究再現的現象，是論文第一部份（前兩章與緒論） 運用在對作品解讀上的主要進路；第二部分，即論文第三章「存有論的視象」， 則試圖從杜畢費對於這群系列作品所賦予的「不在」之說，聯繫在物質引發的 知覺過程中，存有和視象兩者的關係。 「論繪畫物質的視象化」得到的結論是，杜畢費這群系列作品並未落入海德 格「世界成為圖畫」的因果關係裡，作品不應僅僅被視為已知物的再現，作品 的意義只顯示在觀者和作品的知覺互動上。職此，論文最後轉入現象學存有論 的領域，借重Merleau-Ponty「交錯」觀點以證明杜畢費所追尋的「不在的起源」， 其實就存在於「可見性」本身。能夠喚起可見性的「可逆性」，即交錯，它讓杜 畢費「未區分的連續性」之說更具論述上的份量。 Among Dubuffet’s paintings, there exist certain traits that perplex people. He named those very non-graphic works, even with the least suggestion of trace of manual intervention, «Topographies», «Texturologies», «Phénomènes», and «Matériologies», which are non-figurative. In view of artist’s creative ideas and process, and the intensive reference of works, we can assert these four series are representative, not abstract. As a result, what put on the canvas , pigments and other materials like “papier mâché” as well as “papier d’argent”, will never belong to formal elements, rather, they appear as automatic formation by themselves, conveying a sense of tromp l’oeil to spectators. However, the illusion is not established in accordance with the law that media should be transparent, but their necessary presence. This dissertation is intended to study how the perception of representative paintings acts, providing the presence of material is a prerequisite, not just be considered as natural signs. The presence of materials within paintings, coming from the texture in surface, betrays a quality of ambiguity. According to the quality, the scope of discussion has been expanded, on the other hand, it tells that image on which the ordinary representational theory is used to laying particular stress doesn’t satisfy the implication of ambiguity inherent in these works, if not less, giving partial reasons. It is here that Sartre’s distinction between “conscience perceptive” and “conscience imagée” supplements the deficiency of representation of epistemology. Different applied attitudes of consciousness mean that the discord between the theme and content appeared in most of Dubuffet’s works should not be conceived as an error in the representation, nor the invalidity of Gombrich’s mechanism of projection. Instead, we can assume that Dubuffet manipulates two kinds of consciousness, bewildering our seeing. In part one of my dissertation(including the first two chapters and introduction), I adopt Gombrich’s “making-matching” in his Art and Illusion: A Study in the Pictorial Representation and the method of phenomenology, which studies the phenomena of re-presentation as so many distinctly different modes of consciousness, to expound Dubuffet’s materialistic paintings; in part two(i.e. chapter three, “Vision of Ontology”), depending on the word “absence” that Dubuffet has proposed, I try to elucidate the connection between being and vision happening in the process of perception caused by the materials. “On the Visualization of Painting Materials”, concludes that Dubuffet’s serial works during the 50s’ don’t correspond with the concept of Heidegger’s “World Picture”, and the meaning of Dubuffet’s works only reveals in the interaction of perception between seers and paintings, not in the representation of what we’ve known. Herein, I turn to the field of phenomenological ontology, especially appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s “chiasmus”, to prove that “la source de l’absence”, which Dubuffet’s been searching for, actually inheres in the “visibility” itself. In the process of discourse, “reversibility”, i.e. chiasmus which is able to evoke the visibility may support Dubuffet’s “une continuité indifférenciée”. |
