| 摘要: | 不論是對於朱熹（1130-1200；世稱朱子）道德體系在傳統儒學的定位，或朱熹能否合理地詮釋孟子的道德理論的判定，歷來學者的看法並不一致。本論文嘗試透過不同的進路重新理解、詮釋朱熹道德體系的核心概念，並且在此基礎上處理此有爭議性的部分問題。
本論文首先概要的重述美國哲學家Christine Korsgaard所提出的「道德規範理論」中的主要論點，並藉其理論中回答「道德規範問題」的實踐架構：（1）身份蘊涵責任；（2）對身份的實踐認同；（3）有實踐責任的理由；（4）付諸實踐，作為詮釋朱熹道德體系的詮釋架構。
其次，在朱子學的部分，（a）我系統性的重新詮釋其「心性論」中「心」之意涵，證成「心具眾理」是詮釋「心」這概念的起點，以及此——對比牟宗三先生以「心之知覺」為詮釋起點而言的——「詮釋進路轉向」的合理性，並在此基礎上確定、區分朱熹道德體系中「人心」與「道心」的功能作用，前者是認知心，後者是反省心。（b）在前項的基礎上，朱熹肯定行動者有「先天的道德之知」（常知），我據此重建其「工夫論」中「格致工夫」的理論架構：行動者以「常知」作為工夫的起點，並透過實踐的反省而進至「真知」。行動者對「道德之知」達「真知」的程度能給出「行動理由」以回答道德規範性問題。
最後，在朱熹詮釋孟子學的部分，我則是先選擇探究他詮釋孟子的「義利之辨」是否具合理性的判定。除了因為此合理性的判定還必須衡之以根源性概念——例如「仁義內在」——的探究才能做出最終的判定之外，「義利之辨」亦涉及「倫理學形態」的確定，所以，透過此處的探討我們可以掌握他與孟子的「倫理學型態」是否相同。
關鍵字：Korsgaard、道德規範性、行動理由、反省、格物致知、義利之辨
;Different scholars, according to their own interpretive approaches, may have different conclusion to Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy, and also Chu Hsi’s interpretation of Mencius’ moral philosophy. This thesis attempts to reinterpret Chu Hsi’s core concepts of his moral philosophy. On the basis of my interpretation, I will tackle parts of the above mentioned controversial issues.
At first, I will introduce those main positions in Christine Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity. Korsgaard’s framework can be summarized as below: (1) identity implies obligation, (2) having practical identity, (3) having reason to act, (4) to practice the obligation of one’s identity, which could answer normative question. I adopt this framework to be the background to interpret Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy.
Secondly, about Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy: (a) I attempt to reinterpret the meaning of the core concept, Hsin（心）, systematically, and to justify that "Hsin-chü-li" is the primordiality to understand the meaning of Hsin. This justification explains the possibility of the turn of interpretive approach to Hsin in Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy. On the basis of the result, we can distinguish the function between "Jen-hsin（人心）" and " Tao-hsin（道心）". The former is cognitive, and the latter is reflective in Korsgarrd’s terminology. (b) In accordance with the result of (a), it is reasonable that Chu Hsi can claim that agents have innate moral knowledge which is named "Ch’ang-chih"（常知）. According to his claim, I re-establish the framework of "Ko-wu chih-chih（格物致知）". The framework is that Ch’ang-chih（常知）is the primordial concept of "Ko-wu chih-chih", and the agent’s Ch’ang-chih can be transformed into Chen-chih（真知） through practical reflection. As long as the agent’s moral knowledge can be transformed into Chen-chih, the agent can have the reason to act and answer the normative question.
Finally, about Chu Hsi’s interpretation of Mencius’ philosophy, I attempt to investigate whether Chu Hsi can reasonably interpret Mencius’ "Distinction between Rightness and Profit" or not. Because this distinction is concerned with other important concepts, e.g. innateness of Jen and Yi, in Mencius’ moral philosophy, and also with the determination of the mode of ethics, through my investigation, we can see the similarities and dissimilarities of the modes of ethics between Chu Hsi’s and Mencius’.
Keywords: Korsgaard, moral normativity, reason to act, reflect, ko-wu chih-chih, distinction between rightness and profit |
