;Different scholars, according to their own interpretive approaches, may have different conclusion to Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy, and also Chu Hsi’s interpretation of Mencius’ moral philosophy. This thesis attempts to reinterpret Chu Hsi’s core concepts of his moral philosophy. On the basis of my interpretation, I will tackle parts of the above mentioned controversial issues.
At first, I will introduce those main positions in Christine Korsgaard’s theory of moral normativity. Korsgaard’s framework can be summarized as below: (1) identity implies obligation, (2) having practical identity, (3) having reason to act, (4) to practice the obligation of one’s identity, which could answer normative question. I adopt this framework to be the background to interpret Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy.
Secondly, about Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy: (a) I attempt to reinterpret the meaning of the core concept, Hsin（心）, systematically, and to justify that "Hsin-chü-li" is the primordiality to understand the meaning of Hsin. This justification explains the possibility of the turn of interpretive approach to Hsin in Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy. On the basis of the result, we can distinguish the function between "Jen-hsin（人心）" and " Tao-hsin（道心）". The former is cognitive, and the latter is reflective in Korsgarrd’s terminology. (b) In accordance with the result of (a), it is reasonable that Chu Hsi can claim that agents have innate moral knowledge which is named "Ch’ang-chih"（常知）. According to his claim, I re-establish the framework of "Ko-wu chih-chih（格物致知）". The framework is that Ch’ang-chih（常知）is the primordial concept of "Ko-wu chih-chih", and the agent’s Ch’ang-chih can be transformed into Chen-chih（真知） through practical reflection. As long as the agent’s moral knowledge can be transformed into Chen-chih, the agent can have the reason to act and answer the normative question.
Finally, about Chu Hsi’s interpretation of Mencius’ philosophy, I attempt to investigate whether Chu Hsi can reasonably interpret Mencius’ "Distinction between Rightness and Profit" or not. Because this distinction is concerned with other important concepts, e.g. innateness of Jen and Yi, in Mencius’ moral philosophy, and also with the determination of the mode of ethics, through my investigation, we can see the similarities and dissimilarities of the modes of ethics between Chu Hsi’s and Mencius’.
Keywords: Korsgaard, moral normativity, reason to act, reflect, ko-wu chih-chih, distinction between rightness and profit