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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/65342


    Title: 腦神經倫理之道德責任的歸屬: 人格同一性判準的再建構;Attribution of Moral Responsibility in Neuroethics: Reconstruction of the Criterion of Personal Identity
    Authors: 周琬琳;Chou,Wan-ling
    Contributors: 哲學研究所
    Keywords: 道德責任的歸屬;人格同一性;腦神經倫理;倫常關係E;帕菲特;儒家;attribution of moral responsibility;personal identity;neuroethics;ethical relation;Derek Parfit;Confucianism
    Date: 2014-07-28
    Issue Date: 2014-10-15 15:28:16 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 由於行動者要對自己的行為負道德責任,因而行動者之人同一性是一重要的依據以判定行為之道德責入歸屬。傳統上人格同一性主要依據一個個體之記憶或心理連結來加以認定。但現代腦神經科學已進到可以改造一個人的記憶,因而在一個人的記憶受到腦神經科技改變之後,產生了是否要為之前的行為負道德責任的問題。帕菲特批判了西方傳統哲學中兩類的化約主義的判準,即心理判準與物理判準,認為難以回應現代生命科學與腦神經科學發展所產生的情況,特別是心理連結與物理連結之一對多的關係。因此,帕菲特認為在道德責任歸屬上重要的是所謂的「關係R」,即時間上在先行動者與後來的一個或多個行動者是否有足夠的心理連結關係,因而要負多少相關的道德責任。關係R並不着重人格個體之一對一的延續,帕菲特可說是取消了傳統人格同一性的概念。但關係R卻仍然倚賴個體之記愔或心理連結來決定關係R之是否成立,仍然不能確立個人對道德責任之歸屬。歌絲嘉則指出縱使由於大腦分裂,行者之統一性仍然可以提供供我們以辨認行動的責任者,行動者之人格同一仍然可用。但兩者的構想仍然限於西方傳統哲學純以個人之內部心理連結的預設。本文參酌萊布尼茲所提之「旁人之證」可提供確立是否同一人的方式,發展一倫理關係E作為回應人格同一性的判準與辨認個人為誰的方法。儒家認為一個人之人格同一性建立在個人與親密的人所產生的親密關係之中,通常最主要的是家人與親友的關係,故稱為倫常關係E。除了記憶之連續性之外,倫常關係E可以提供由具有親密關係的旁人來指認當事人的真實的身份,由此可以免於受腦神經干撓記憶的改變而產生的難以確認一個個體的真正人格同一性的問題。這一關係涵蓋個人之縱貫連續性與橫的社群關係的連續性。因而具備主觀與客觀的條件,更準確和如實確立一個人之前後的同一性。本文由此申論倫常關係E所提供的檢定先後的兩個人是否同一人的判準和相關的倫理爭議中道德的歸屬的判定,以見出此概念之理論效果之優點。;As an agent has moral responsibility for his actions, personal identity is an important basis to determine the attribution of moral responsibility. Traditionally, personal identity is mainly determined based on an individual′s memory or psychological connection. However, neuroscience and technology have developed to a stage that could change a person′s memory, and it generates a problem that whether one has to bear the moral responsibility for actions before one’s memory was changed. Parfit criticized the two main reductionist criteria of personal identity of the Western philosophical tradition, namely the psychological and physical criterion. He regards them unable to respond to the challenge of neuroscience especially the one to many relationship made possible by recent scientific technology. Parfit thinks that what is important in attribution of moral responsibility is what he called "relation R", that is, whether there are enough psychological continuity between the earlier and the later agents The more the greater moral responsibility. Relation R does not focus on the continuity of a person. Parfit could be said to nullify the traditional concept of personal identity. However, relation R still relies on individual’s memory or psychological connection to determent whether relation R is established, it would not be able to determine the attribution of moral responsibility. Korsgaard points out that even if in the brain fission case, the unity of agency still can provide identification to whom the responsibility of the action should be attributed. However, both conceptions are limited to traditional Western philosophy which presupposes responsibility is tied purely to the individual’s internal psychological connection. This paper adapts Leibniz’ proposal of “the concurring testimony of other people" for the identification of a person and develops an ethical relation E in response to the problem of personal identity. I borrow the Confucian idea of intimate family relationship in reconstruction since for Confucian a person’s identity is closely shared with one’s family members with whom one grows up since born. The most important one is the relationship between family members and friends, and in Chinese tradition, it is called ethical relation, as it conveys something permanent in our personal identity. Hence, besides memory, ethical relation E could provide a way for the identification of a person through his or her intimate relations with others and could avoid the interference of neurotechnologies. In fact, relation E provides longitudinal and co-temporal social elements and thus a criterion with both subjective and objective aspects for the true identity of a person. Finally, I apply this criterion to solve some of the thorny questions of attribution of moral responsibilities of related neuroethical and bioethical issues to show its theoretical effectiveness.
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