本文探討選擇權及限制型股票薪酬對會計穩健性之影響。使用績效薪酬佔總薪酬變數及績效薪酬相對比例測試其對會計穩健性之不同意義。實證結果顯示選擇權績效薪酬減少會計穩健性，限制型股票績效薪酬增加會計穩健性，其主要導因於薪酬獲利曲線特性，選擇權具無上限獲利曲線特性，使經理人有提升股價之較高誘因。我們發現在FAS123-R實施前，選擇權績效薪酬增加會計穩健性，限制型股票績效薪酬則減少會計穩健性，FAS123-R實施後則反之，FAS123-R改革大幅減少選擇權之財報誘因，同採公允價值衡量後，純導因於獲利曲線特性為之。本研究之意涵為未來公司內部設計獎酬制度之建議，提供員工績效薪酬影響會計穩健性之證據，公司獎酬制度應將會計穩健性及員工獎酬特性納入考量。;We provide evidences on the relationship between the performance-related compensation and accounting conservatism. Our results do support that using more option compensations would decrease the accounting conservatism. On the contrary, company using more restricted stocks would have higher accounting conservatism. The main reason leading to the result is the profit curve of options and restricted stocks. For the options, the profit curve has no limit on the top. Manager has more incentives to raise the stock price. We found that using more option compensation would increase the accounting conservatism before the implement of FAS123-R. However, after the implement of FAS123-R, using more option compensation would decrease the accounting conservatism. The implement of FAS123-R significantly reduce the incentives of earnings for using option evaluated by intrinsic value methods. Since both option and restricted compensation evaluated by fair value methods, the effect of performance-related compensation on accounting conservatism would mainly lead by the profit curve. We provide the suggestion on the compensation design. Company should consider the accounting conservatism and the feature of different compensation into the consideration when establishing the regulation of compensation.