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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/66878


    Title: 分散式無線感測網路之輕量化金鑰管理機制;Lightweight Key Management Schemes for Distributed Wireless Sensor Networks
    Authors: 陳明軒;Chen,Ming-Hsuan
    Contributors: 資訊工程學系
    Keywords: 金鑰管理;無線感測網路;門檻式秘密分享技術;節點捕獲攻擊;惡意程式注入;key management;wireless sensor networks;threshold secret sharing;node capture attack;malicious code injection
    Date: 2014-11-26
    Issue Date: 2015-03-16 15:57:42 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 近年來無線感測網路在許多關鍵場所上被廣泛應用,像是軍事、機場、醫療等環境來進行環境監控或感測。由於感測節點的資源配備與計算能力是受限的,因此,在現實中不太能夠使用較昂貴的防竄改硬體來保護節點內部重要的秘密金鑰。

    而在無線感測網路中最為嚴重的兩種威脅分別是節點捕獲 (Node Capture) 與惡意程式注入攻擊 (Malicious Code Injection)。攻擊者可以藉由物理得方式來捕獲感測節點並竊取記憶體內部可利用的秘密資訊。此外,攻擊者也可以將惡意程式注入到被捕獲的感測節點中,並將它置回原處。事實上,一個惡意節點將有能力去偽裝成一般的感測節點來傳送偽造的資料給基地台 (Base Station)。

    因此在無線感測網路中,金鑰管理機制上的安全性成為一個重要的議題。許多學者們提出了門檻式秘密共享機制來防禦前述所提及的攻擊。這些方法採用了Shamir 的門檻式秘密共享機制來將主秘鑰 (Master Key) 切為許多小部份,並給予鄰近節點屬於它自己的部份。然而,此方法只適用於擁有較高計算資源的叢集頭 (Cluster Head) 之階層式無線感測網路架構下。

    所以,我們提出一種較有效率且基於簡單秘密共享 (Trivial Secret Sharing)之金鑰管理機制,此方法能夠適用於分散式無線感測網路架構之下。經由局部檢測之群組化秘密共享金鑰管理機制 (group-based secret sharing key management scheme via local attestation) ,此方法不僅能夠抵抗節點捕獲攻擊,也能檢測出節點是否已被注入惡意。此外,如同Shamir 的門檻式秘密共享機制,此方法一樣能夠容忍節點損壞的情況,但也僅使用到了互斥或運算。;In recently years, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have been deployed for a wide variety of mission-critical applications such as monitoring and sensing in military, airports, and healthcare environments. Due to limited resources and computing constraints, it is impractical to use the expensive tamper-resistant hardware for protecting the secret keying material.

    Two of the most serious threats in WSN are node capture attack and malicious code injection. In order to instigate these attacks, the adversary can physically capture
    some sensor nodes and steal the keying materials from their internal memories. Also, the captured nodes can be reprogrammed with malicious code and redeployed back. In fact, the compromised node can always behave normally and send forged data to base station.

    Therefore, security of the key management for WSN becomes the important issue. Researchers have proposed several threshold secret sharing schemes for preventing above attacks. The scheme adopts the idea of Shamir’s (t,n) threshold secret sharing algorithm to divide the master key into many parts and give each neighbor node its own unique part. However, it is more suitable for hierarchical WSN architecture because of the cluster head has more powerful computational capabilities.

    Accordingly, we propose the efficient key management scheme based on trivial secret sharing which is feasible in the distributed WSN architecture. The proposed group-based secret sharing key management scheme via local attestation can not only prevent the node capture attack but also attest whether the internal memories have been maliciously compromised or not. The proposed scheme can tolerate the node broken situation as same as Shamir’s (t,n) threshold secret sharing scheme, but only use the exclusive-or operation.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Computer Science and Information Engineering] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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