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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/68688


    Title: 基於有限預算標價式拍賣之異質性頻譜分配方法;A Posted-price Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing under Budget Constraints
    Authors: 賴文祥;Lai,Wen-hsiang
    Contributors: 通訊工程學系
    Keywords: 預算限制;無線感知網路;異質性頻段;Budget Constraint;Cognitive Radio Networks;Heterogeneous Subchannel
    Date: 2015-08-17
    Issue Date: 2015-09-23 14:07:48 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 隨著無線網路技術拓展與產品的普及,導致頻譜資源的需求與日俱增,使得無線頻譜資源逐漸匱乏,因此有效地提升頻段資源的使用率是通訊中重要的一項議題。無線感知網路為近年來所發展的新型通訊模式,目的是提高頻譜的使用率,故研究高效率的頻譜分配機制是有其必要性。

    在本文中,我們設計一個無線感知網路系統模型,其組成為一個頻譜擁有者 (PO)、多個主要使用者 (PU) 和多個次要使用者 (SU)。我們設計了一個拍賣模式的頻段分配,其中 SU 作為競標者來競標頻段,而 PO 作為拍賣者拍賣空白頻段以獲得利潤。

    隨著目前技術的發展,應著重於更符合實際情況的異質性頻段。我們實現一個拍賣模式的頻譜拍賣模式。根據次要使用者們的預算與其估值,決定相對應的物品的價格以符合經濟屬性與預算及數量限制條件。本篇提出線性規劃與公布價格式機制來進行有效率的頻譜分配,在文中會加以詳述。最後的數值模擬將討論SU之效能函數、PO的收益函數和整體社會福利函數於不同預算限制、異質性與同質性與其他參考文獻所提出的方法進行分析。;Cognitive radio is a well-known communication paradigm that can significantly improve spectrum utilization by allowing the cognitive radio users (unlicensed users) to dynamically utilize the licensed spectrum. Studying efficient spectrum allocation mechanism is urgent due to this situation. In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network consisting of a primary spectrum owner (PO), multiple primary users (PU) and multiple secondary users (SU). We propose a sequential posted-price auction mechanism (SPA) for spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks where the SUs bid to buy spectrum bands from the PO who acts as the auctioneer, selling idle spectrum bands to make a profit and consider a more general and more realistic case where channels have different qualities. Also, SUs are allowed to express their preferences for each channel separately. That is, each SU submits a vector of bids, one for each channel and purchase the spectrum bands under their own budgets. This mechanism will proceed by the Linear Programming Relaxation (LPR) to achieve the high efficiency of the spectrum allocation which involves the economic properties and the budget limit. Finally, we will show some results to show what performance in terms of utility, revenue and social welfare between our work and the previous.
    Appears in Collections:[通訊工程研究所] 博碩士論文

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