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|Keywords: ||台灣高鐵;財務改善計畫;投資可行性分析;8十事業模式;THSR;financial improvement program;investment feasibility analysis;8-cross business model|
|Issue Date: ||2016-10-13 13:57:12 (UTC+8)|
研究結果發現高鐵BOT會失敗的最主原因是在代理問題，民間企業的經營模式在尋求利益極大化，高鐵係屬於大眾公共運輸交通工具，民眾公共利益與資源適當分配實為不可忽略之營運方針，這是民間企業無心達成之經營理念。第二階段雖由泛公股掌握經營權，但公司截至2014年底已虧損466億元，實在只有財改一途可行。2016年國營後的高鐵可望能增加國庫收入，增加國家資本，政府有足夠的資金來源，才能大舉公共建設，回饋資源給人民，增進人民福祉。本研究建議已國營事業的高鐵具有政策性與社會性，後續可隨著新政府的執政做相關議題之研究。;The construction of the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) began in 1999 and its operations started in January 2007. However, under the influence of the macro environment, ridership has been running low since the service began. In 2008, the deficit was NT$67.5 billion; in 2009, former chairperson Nita Ing resigned; and the board of directors elected Chin-der Ou, representative of government-invested groups, as the new chairperson. On November 11 of the same year, government-invested groups took over operations to end the THSR’s BOT period. However, revenue was still lower than expected. On March 13, 2014, the board of directors elected Tony C. Fan, representative of corporate director Airline Career Development Association, as the new chairperson. On January 7, 2015, former Transport Minister Kuang-shih Yeh and THSR Chairperson Tony C. Fan proposed a THSR financial reform project and emphasized that the THSR would soon be bankrupt without a financial reform. Although the THSR was operated by government-invested groups, there was no way out. In 2015, capital reduction and capital increase were completed respectively on October 20 and November 26 under the leadership of Chairperson Victor W. Liu. In 2016, the THSR officially became a state business. Whether or not this new business model carries the key factors required for feasible investment is worthy of in-depth analysis.
The aim of this study is to investigate: (1) The key factors causing the failure of the BOT model of the THSR at stage I (1997-2009); (2) the key factors causing the failure of operations by government-invested groups after the financial reform of the THSR at stage II (2010-2015); and (3) whether or not the THSR is feasible for investments after becoming a state business at stage III (2016-2019).
This study found that the agency model is the main cause of the BOT failure of the THSR. Private enterprises aim to maximize profits. As the THSR is part of public transport, public interest and suitable resource allocation are inseparable. This is a business concept unachievable by private enterprises. At stage II, the THSR was operated by government-invested groups, but the deficit accumulated to NT$46.6 billion by the end of 2014, making financial reformation the only solution. After the THSR became a state business in 2016, it is expected that it will increase the treasury income and national capital. The government needs adequate fund sources to implement infrastructure projects to repay citizens with resources and promote the well-being of people. As a state business, the THSR is part of the government policy and social welfare consideration. Future studies can investigate relevant topics as the new government starts its administration.
|Appears in Collections:||[高階主管企管（EMBA）碩士班] 博碩士論文|
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