我們的研究以多重代理人的觀點，檢驗在沙賓法案實施之後，執行長與財務長之間的誘因薪酬差距所產生的意涵。沙賓法案第302段及第404段明確規範執行長與財務長對內部控制品質及財務報導負有責任。我們的研究在沙賓法案的架構之下，基於執行長與財務長所做出的決策易受到誘因薪酬的影響，故測試執行長與財務長之間的誘因薪酬差距對於內部控制缺失及盈餘管理的效果。我們的研究證據顯示，誘因薪酬差距愈大導致愈嚴重的內部控制缺失；而且當公司處於內部控制缺失的環境之下，誘因薪酬差距愈大愈會造成盈餘管理的現象。;On the basis of multi-agent perspective, our study investigates the implication of the incentive gap between CEO and CFO, after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 302 and section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly specify their responsibility for the internal control quality and the financial reporting. Our study uses the framework of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Under this framework, we examine the effect of the incentive gap between CEO and CFO on internal control weaknesses and earnings management because there is a tendency that the incentive compensation affects decisions made by CEO and CFO. Our paper presents the evidence that the higher incentive gap leads to the severer internal control problems. Furthermore, companies under the internal control weakness environment, the higher incentive gap results in more earnings management.