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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/771


    Title: 寡占技術市場下大型垃圾焚化廠建廠技術移轉之賽局分析;Analysis of Technology Transfer of Large-scale Waste Incinerator Plants in Oligopoly Market with Game Theoretical Approach
    Authors: 吳典育;Dian-yu Wu
    Contributors: 土木工程研究所
    Keywords: 焚化廠;營建管理;賽局理論;技術移轉;Construction Management;Waste Incinerator Construction;Game Theory;Technology Transfer
    Date: 2002-06-07
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 17:12:06 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: 國內興建大型垃圾焚化廠的時機較遲,技術發展之日程有限,導致國內焚化廠興建廠商的技術能力仍屬相對劣勢之地位,故藉由與國外技術優勢廠商合作,以技術移轉快速提昇技術層次為一必要之捷徑。 大型垃圾焚化廠的興建有其寡占技術市場之特性,廠商間明顯之策略互動,展現在技術移轉的決策行為中,本研究擬歸納整理焚化廠建廠技術移轉的諸多特性,轉化為賽局分析之基本假設,且針對焚化廠統包商於系統整合構面之技術移轉時期,以賽局理論分析其在各階段、情境中之效用函數,並在廠商追求利潤極大的原則下,求導廠商互動性策略行為之均衡結果;另一方面,由於國內統包商在技術移轉中常居於技術輸入一方,故本研究亦對於可能的報酬金定價以及輸入廠商之最適研發投入作一般化的函數建立。 依據本研究之賽局推導結果,焚化廠之統包商從事技術移轉時,輸出廠商在沒有特殊之契約限制下,且輸入廠商在前置移轉及研發策略階段,皆未接受移轉亦皆研發失敗,則輸出廠商將會於後續移轉階段中以差別定價的方式,藉由次輪之移轉行為,剝削輸入廠商的剩餘價值,但相對而言,輸入廠商亦知悉此一策略,故其會擬定應對之機制,對輸出廠商之行為加以約束;此外,若技術輸入廠商在前置移轉階段中皆未接受移轉,則其於研發策略階段時,將會選擇組成研發聯盟,以共同承擔風險亦共享研發成果。 As environmental protection issues become pivotal in infrastructure policy-making, the construction of large-scale waste incinerator plants are placed upon an accelerated timetable. On policy consideration, technology transfer lies in the heart of accelerating the construction of waste incinerator plants (WIPs) around the country. The game between technology exporter, all foreign firms, and domestic construction firms affords prominent investigation. As the market of waste incinerator technology is oligopoly and the demand for WIPs is fairly limited, the game between technology exporters and the importer is characteristic. The primary goal of the exporters is profit maximization in the long run, rather than the short one; however, the technology importer will be concerned more with the profit at stake, ie. project based. In essence, the game between the players is a decision regarding the pricing of a one-off technology transfer deal. In this work, the technology transfer issue is being transformed into four-stage game settings. There exists equilibrium in each of the four stages. While the stages are sequentially related, the outcome of technology transfer will be binary, namely success or failure. The merit of this work is to observe how the exporter would exploit the importer, based on its economic advantage, through the sequential game settings. On reverse, the importer’s defense would be his selection of a most suitable partner and his ability to enhance his in-house R&D.
    Appears in Collections:[土木工程研究所] 博碩士論文

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