家族控制企業下董事會構成員忠實義務之研究：以比較法為中心;The Study in Duty of Loyalty for the Board of Directors of the Family-Controlled Corporation that Based on the Comparative Approaches

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題名:	家族控制企業下董事會構成員忠實義務之研究：以比較法為中心;The Study in Duty of Loyalty for the Board of Directors of the Family-Controlled Corporation that Based on the Comparative Approaches
作者:	吳尊傑;Ng, Chun-Kit
貢獻者:	法律與政府研究所
關鍵詞:	忠實義務規範;家族控制股東;大同五次經營權爭奪戰;家族控制企業之所有權結構;家族董事會;法人否定說;家族治理;公司治理;專業守門人責任;家族辦公室;公司守門人;整體公平審查法;少數股東代位訴訟機制;揭開公司面紗原則;反向揭開公司面紗原則;Duty of loyalty;Family-controlling shareholders;Taiwan Da-tong Company in the battle for the management rights;Ownership structure of family-controlled businesses;Family Board;Legal personality denial;Family governance;Corporate governance Principles;Professional Gatekeeper Responsibility;Family Office;Company Gatekeeper;Entire Fairness Review;Shareholders Litigation;Veil the Corporation Veil Principle;Reversing Piercing the Corporate Veil
日期:	2019-07-09
上傳時間:	2019-09-03 14:56:47 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	依據本文調研相關資料顯示，中華民國臺灣地區家族企業佔全部上市櫃股份有限公司之約百分之七十強（不含非上市櫃公司約占全部註冊公司數量之百分之九十以上）。本研究之第一章，將作為貫穿往後章節之透過闡明現行公司法第二十三條第一項之忠實義務規範，即自公元兩千年立法通過後，學說實務所面臨之窘境為何？蓋「忠實義務」一詞乃是師法自美國法制，故本研究實有必要對美國歷來猶關忠實義務之重要判決進行整理，望能歸納出當中的原理原則。此外，若此法制對於我國臺灣地區中小企業普遍存在家族控制股東之情況下，對少數股東事後依公司法第八條第三項、二十三條第一項以及第二一四條提起代位訴訟時，會否造成甚麼不利的影響？在在都值得本研究進一步深入探討。除此之外，如何事前即締造家族企業之良治，唯在於避免事後提起相關代位訴訟之緩不濟急，是故誠以「大同五次經營權爭奪戰」為家族治理之非典型案型，藉以提倡事前家族良治的模型來減低事後少數股東與家族控制股東間法律訟爭之機率；最後提出本研究對臺灣地區未來公司法將何去何從之個人建議。　　本研究之第二章，一來務先令讀者透徹家族企業外觀與內在之梗概：從家族控制企業之始，再到家族控制企業之所有權結構，爾後分別從關係企業、交叉持股、交叉董事、轉投資特殊目的公司以及雙層股權結構來觀察家族企業中複雜的控制權與所有權問題。二０一八年公司法修法放寬非公開發行股份有限公司得發行複數表決權特別股，如此在可預期的未來，當非公開發行家族公司或公開發行之家族企業透過非上市櫃股份有限公司或閉鎖性股份有限公司來發行複數表決權特別股時，對非控制股東權益會造成如何之影響？順此問題意識而下，本文亦將從家族控制企業下董事會構成員中觀察，探討現行臺灣法制及相關實務見解之認定標準，分別為理論上家族董事會的概念與現實中家族董事會的模型進行比較；在此模型之下，控制股東與關係企業集團因治理而產生特定議題，尤其是在現行法無文規範契約上關係企業的情況下，家族關係企業集團最終得以形塑其獨有控制股東與少數股東間之利害叢生的衝突結構，最後本研究將從法人學說來梳理家族企業法人之本質，主張現階段應以「法人否定說」來否定家族企業之法人格。　　本研究之第三章，家族治理與公司治理應如何調和？從公司治理的本質出發、再從家族控制企業成員的代理成本中觀察、亦從家族控制企業成員利益最大化中觀察以及臺灣大同公司歷次經營權爭奪戰中觀察家族治理。蓋現階段我國臺灣地區家族企業普遍存在控制股東的情況下，非家族成員之股東如何能被公平對待？其次，藉由二０一八年公司法修正通過條文針對非公發公司得為表決權拘束契約之規定，本文將會重新省思其對非家族股東權利之影響。最後，運用晚近相關公司法學者所提倡之專業守門人責任規範，來思考如何建構會計師、律師、證券分析師等資本市場守門人來推動家族企業之良治；基此，本文建議引進內嵌式家族辦公室，以其來作為捍衛家族企業之公司守門人，進一步調控家族企業之內在和外在風險因子。　　本研究之第四章，係比較臺灣與美國法制下對董事忠實義務之規範，分別從信託法和美國判例法的角度，來逐一檢視忠實關係之構成要件、其內涵、其之誕生史以及臺灣移殖此法制後之心路歷程。忠實義務在Smith案後相關概念之形成與發展，有關忠實義務之重要判決，依次為1993年的Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc.案、1996年In re Caremark代位訴訟案、2006年的In re Walt Disney Co.代位訴訟案以及Stone v.Ritter案；其次，依據德拉瓦州判例法，當股東起訴請求被告董事違反對公司或股東的受託義務時，法院即需對董事之違反受託義務之行為依最嚴格的標準進行司法審查，稱之為「整體公平審查法」(Entire Fairness Review)；爾後，本研究將從1983年Weinberger v. UOP 案以及In re Cox Communications 案等判決，去深入剖析整體公平審查法之起源與演進過程；最後，即運用比較法的方法，來進一步檢視控制股東應如何公平對待少數股東的權利。　　本研究之第五章，為檢討現行臺灣地區法制對少數股東相關私權救濟機制，是否完善？當中尤以家族控制股東與少數股東間因私有化而有之衝突為甚。本文比較二０一八年公司法修法前後之對少數股東代位訴訟機制之變化情況後，再依修法前研究者對健全少數股東救濟機制之相關建議：即就訴訟標的數額核定問題與降低代表訴訟門檻等問題，提出相關可供參考之建議，本研究除評釋前人所提之建議外，更將試圖提出個人見解。即在美國法下揭穿公司面紗原則在本次公司法修法後，是否有被進一步運用的空間？傳統來說，美國法上的揭開公司面紗原則在實務上得已被適用的情況，如當股東濫用公司法人格地位時，此時股東有限責任原則能否被「揭穿」？惟往往是在與公司產生非自願債權債務時，方得被「揭穿」；例外的情形，縱使是「自願債權人」，也得被揭穿公司面紗原則，相關案例隨後探討。值得一提的是，一九八六年的Laya案中，法院首次定出十九個判斷控制股東是否濫用其「控制力」的因素，值得我國臺灣地區日後修法增訂公司法第八條之一時援引此判決先例，最後，本文會就引進反向揭開公司面紗原則進行可行性分析，並提出本文見解：即現行法除可以債權代位說來揭穿公司面紗外，更能以少數股權直接訴訟說為之。　　本研究之第六章乃結論暨修法建議，將透過大同公司一封告股東公開信來思考公司法相關條文日後將如何往保障家族企業少數股東權益方向進行修正。 ;According to the data of this research, family companies in Taiwan account for about 70% of all listed cabinet companies (excluding non-listed companies of family businesses account for more than 90% of all registered companies). The first chapter of this study will serve as a preamble for clarifying the duty of loyalty of the one paragraph of Article 23 of the current company law, which is the dilemma facing the doctrine and court practice after the passage of the two thousand years of legislation. The term duty of loyalty or duty of a fiduciary is the rule of law from the American legal system or we should say that is the common law system. Therefore, it is necessary for this study to sort out the important judgments (Stare decisis) of the United States, and hope to sum up the principles of this law. In addition, if this duty of loyalty can be applied to family-controlled shareholders in Taiwanese SMEs, the minority shareholders will have right to shareholders derivative suit by the company in accordance with Articles 8 (3), 23 (1) and 214 of the Company Law. Will it cause any adverse effects? In the course of this is worth further research. In addition, how to create good governance of family business beforehand, only to avoid the urgency of raising the relevant subrogation lawsuit afterwards, is the atypical case of the family governance of "Datong management rights battle". Promote the model of good family governance beforehand to reduce the chance of legal disputes between minority shareholders and family-controlled shareholders. Finally, this paper puts forward personal recommendations on how future company law in Taiwan will go. In the second chapter of this study, the first step is to let the readers thoroughly understand the appearance and internal outline of the family business: from the beginning of the family-controlled business to the ownership structure of it, then from the Affiliated Enterprises, Cross-shareholding, interlocking directorate system, reinvest to special purpose entities and a dual-class stock structure to observe complex control and ownership issues in family businesses. In 2018, the company′s legal amendments will broaden the non-public offering, which is stock corporations to issue special voting shares, so in the foreseeable future that how will the minority shareholders′ equity be affected by the issue of special voting shares? Under the circumstance of these issues, this thesis will also observe the members of the board under the family-controlled enterprises and explore the current standards of rule of law of Taiwan and related practical opinions by Financial Supervisory Commission of ROC. This thesis compares the concept of the family companies′ board in theory with the model of the family board under practice. Under this model, controlling shareholders and related corporate groups generate specific issues due to governance, especially in the case of existing corporations with no legal norms, the family affiliated group can finally shape its unique controlling shareholders and minority structure of the interests of shareholders, and finally this study will sort out the essence of the family business legal person from the legal person theory, and advocate that the legal personality of the family business should be denied at the present stage. In the third chapter of this study, how should family governance and corporate governance be reconciled? Starting from the essence of corporate governance, and then observing from the agency costs of family-controlled corporate members, and also observing from the maximization of the interests of members of the board of a family-controlled corporation and take Taiwan Datong Company as an example, the family governance in the battle for the management rights. In this situation, how can shareholders of non-family members be treated fairly when the family companies are generally controlled by family controlling shareholders? Secondly, this thesis will rethink its impact on the rights of non-family shareholders by the provisions of the 2017 Law Amendment to the provisions of the Voting Rights Agreement for non-listed companies. Finally, using the professional gatekeeper responsibility standard advocated by the recent related company law scholars to think about how to construct accountants, lawyers, securities analysts and other capital market gatekeepers to promote the good governance of family businesses; based on this, this thesis proposes to introduce embedded family office, as the company′s gatekeeper to defend the family business, further regulates the internal and external risk factors of the family business. The fourth chapter of this study compares the regulation of duty of loyalty to directors under the legal system of Taiwan and the United States. From the perspective of trust law and American case law, it examines the constituent elements of loyalty, its connotation, its originality and how to apply to real cases in Taiwan. After the legal transplant that how to avoid one thing can′t be removed from its environment of origin. The duty of loyalty that is after the case of formation and development of related concepts in the Smith case that is a very important case study on duty of loyalty, then the following cases are Cede & Co in 1993, In re Caremark Case in 1996, the Walt Disney Co in 2006 and the Stone case. Secondly, according to the case law of Delaware state, when the shareholder sues the defendant’s director for breach of the fiduciary duty to the company or the shareholder, the court is required to apply with the most stringent standards, called the “Entire Fairness Review”. Also, the study will be further analyzed from the 1983 Weinberger v. UOP case and the Cox Communications case. The origin and evolution process of the Entire Fairness Review. Finally, comparative legal approaches are used to further examine how controlling shareholders should treat minority shareholders fairly. The fifth chapter of this study is to review whether the minority shareholders′ private rights relief mechanism is good or bad. Among them, there is a conflict between family-controlling shareholder and minority shareholders due to privatization. This thesis compares the changes in the minority shareholder litigation mechanism before and after the company′s legal amendments in 2018. Then, based on some scholars or researchers recommended that improvement of the minority shareholder′s relief mechanism is based on the issue of Determination of the Value of Claim and Lower the threshold for a representative action. In addition to commenting on the suggestions made by the predecessors, this thesis will attempt to present personal opinions. Under US law, the rule of piercing the corporate veil or disregard the corporate personality. Is there any room for further use after 2018 company law amendment? Traditionally, the US law has uncovered the fact that the corporate veil principle has been applied in practice. For example, when shareholders abuse the corporate personality status, can the principle of shareholder limited liability be “debunked”? However, when it comes to involuntary contract and debtors with the company, it must be "debunked" in the case of exceptions, even if it is a "voluntary creditor," it must be piercing the corporate veil. It is worth mentioning that in the Laya case in 1986, the court first determined 19 factors that judge whether the controlling shareholders abused their "controlling power". It is very useful for the Taiwan court to apply that rule based on piercing the corporate veil in the future. Invoking the precedent of this judgment, finally but not least, this thesis will conduct a feasibility analysis on the principle of reversing piercing the corporate veil and put forward the insight of this thesis. The sixth chapter of this study is the conclusion and the proposal for the company law amendment. It will be through the opening announcement from Datong Company to the public shareholders. To think about how the relevant provisions of the company law will be amended in the future to avoid directors of the family-controlled business to abusing the controlling power for the purpose of protecting the minority shareholders′ right.
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