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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/9748

    Title: RFID標籤匿名性之研究與分析;Cryptanalysis on RFID Authentication Protocols with Tag Anonymity
    Authors: 程胤凱;Yin-kai Chen
    Contributors: 資訊工程研究所
    Keywords: 標籤匿名性;RFID認證協定;tag anonymity;RFID authentication protocol
    Date: 2009-06-19
    Issue Date: 2009-09-22 11:55:11 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: Hash-based RFID 認證協定可以幫助管理系統變的更加有效率,以及保護使用者的隱私。在本論文中,我們主要的研究是RFID 認證協定之標籤(Tag)匿名性。 在2008 年時,王等人提出了一種重送攻擊(Replay Attack)在Yang等人所提出的認證協定。此攻擊需在1)伺服器(Server)與讀取器(Reader)之間的通訊通道為不安全之通訊通道以及2)標籤不會執行更新金鑰之動作之假設下才能進行攻擊,當成功攻擊後,攻擊者可以透過從標謙所收集來的訊息來辨識標籤,使Yang 等人的協定不具有標籤匿名性。王等人對Yang 等人的認證協定進行改善,並提出一個新的認證協定。 而在此論文中,我們提出了新奇的重送攻擊在Yang 等人的認證協定以及王等人的認證協定上。此重送攻擊與王的重送攻擊差別在於,我們的重送攻擊可以1)幫助攻擊者透過伺服器所傳送出來的訊息來辨識標籤2)即使此攻擊只需使用上述中的第一項假設,即可攻擊成功。 在我們所提出的認證協定中,我們可以得知,若RFID 認證協定具有讀取器認證性(Reader authentication)以及標籤匿名性(Tag anonymity),我們所提出的重送攻擊將無法攻擊成功。因此我們提出了一個改進的認證協定,此協定達到上述的兩種安全性質,因此可以成功的抵擋我們所提出的重送攻擊以及我們所定義的金鑰破解(Key compromise)攻擊,王等人所提出的重送攻擊與王等人所提出的DoS 攻擊。 Hash-based RFID authentication protocols can help management systems to be more efficient and protect user privacy. In this thesis, our research focus on hash-based RFID authentication protocols with tag anonymity. In 2008, Wang et al. proposed a replay attack on Yang et al.'s protocol. Under two assumptions that 1) channels between servers and readers are insecure, and 2) tags do not update its secret key pair, the replay attack can help an adversary to recognize tags by processing outputs from tags. Wang et al. also proposed a protocol which can resist their replay attack. We propose two novel replay attacks on Yang et al.'s protocol and Wang et al.'s protocol. Different from Wang et al.'s replay attack, our proposed replay attacks can 1) help an adversary to recognize tag by comparing outputs from one server, and 2) successfully work only under the first assumption. In our proposed replay attack, we deduce that if RFID authentication protocols satisfy strong tag anonymity and reader authentication, our proposed replay attacks will be failed. Therefore, we propose an improved protocol which satisfies these security properties, and can resist our proposed replay attacks, our defined key compromise attack, Wang et al.'s replay attack and Wang et al.'s DoS attack.
    Appears in Collections:[資訊工程研究所] 博碩士論文

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