博碩士論文 85444001 詳細資訊




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姓名 陳俊宏(Chun-Hung Chen)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 產業經濟研究所
論文名稱 完全互補品之相關議題
(Issues on Perfect Complementary Components)
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摘要(中) 本論文包含三篇獨立之文章,其中第一篇文章是「完全互補要素之純粹寡占」,第二篇文章是「完全互補性與公民營混合之寡占」,第三篇文章是「系統中間財與最適最終財出口貿易政策」。各文均以當代專業分工的經濟現象為主軸,針對產品或生產要素之間的完全互補特性,深入分析完全互補品的經濟理論與相關應用。
首先,第一篇文章承襲寡占理論中的經典名著關於「鋅銅雙占」完全互補性的脈絡,進行新式市場結構的擴展與均衡的比較。本研究發現「鋅銅雙占」的均衡價格,與消費者自行向廠商購買互補生產要素時的模型相同,與廠商向完全互補廠商購買生產要素時的模型亦相同。此外,當廠商之間的訂價有先後順序之別的狀況下,其結果均等於聞名的雙層獨占之模型。
其次,第二篇文章探討公民營事業共存且具有完全互補性的市場結構,分析公營與民營事業的訂價策略,並探討公營事業存在的價值。本研究發現民營事業確有先行者的優勢,但倘若法律規範公營事業不能虧損,則民營事業將喪失先行者的優勢。此外,當需求曲線並非十分凸向原點時,公營與民營並存的混和寡占,將優於全面民營化。
最後,第三篇文章旨在探討中間財具有完全互補性的情況下,其最適的貿易政策之方向。本研究發現無論兩國最終財廠商從事Cournot數量競爭、Bertrand價格競爭,或是具猜測變量的數量或價格競爭,本國政府的最適出口政策皆是對最終財的出口採取出口補貼政策。此一結論與Eaton and Grossman (1986) 一文的結論大異其趣。
關鍵字(中) ★ 完全互補
★ 策略性貿易
★ 中間財
★ 系統產品
★ 民營化
★ 鋅銅雙占
★ 混合寡占
關鍵字(英) ★ Intermediate Input
★ Mixed Oligopoly
★ Privatization
★ Copper-Zinc Duopoly
★ System Product
★ Strategic Trade
★ Perfect Complements
論文目次 目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 完全互補要素之純粹寡占 8
1. 前言8
2. 自行組成模型: Model A 10
3. 非自行組成模型: Model B 12
4. 序列自行組成模型: Model C 13
5. 結論 17
6. 參考文獻 18
7. 附錄 19
第三章 完全互補性與公民營混合之寡占       26
1. 前言 26
2. 基本模型 31
3. 模型分析 33
4. 自給自足規範的公營企業 37
5. 結語 40
6. 參考文獻 41
7. 附錄 44
第四章 系統中間財與最適最終財出口貿易政策          49
1. 前言 49
2. 基本模型 52
3. Cournot 數量競爭與最適最終財出口政策 54
4. Bertrand 價格競爭與最適最終財出口政策 59
5. 一致性猜測的競爭與最適最終財出口政策 63
6. 結論 65
7. 參考文獻 67
第五章 結論 69
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指導教授 張明宗、吳大任
(Ming-Chung Chang、Dachrahn Wu)
審核日期 2005-7-21
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