董監事會職能與企業績效關聯性之研究

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吳欣玫(Hsin-Mei Wu) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

董監事會職能與企業績效關聯性之研究
(The Relationship between Board Competency and Corporate Performance)

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摘要(中)

本研究探討董監事會職能與企業營運績效之關聯性，並探討董監事會兩種主要功能（監督控制、資源提供）的互補效果，對於企業績效帶來之影響。蒐集台灣2010年到2015年臺灣上市公司為研究樣本，根據臺灣經濟新報（TEJ）臺灣董監事職責與專業度DB資料庫，提出七項董事會職能：董監事會規模、內部董事與外部董事人數、獨立董事兼職數、董監事會開會次數、出席率與董監事教育程度、專業經歷來歸納剖析。
實證結果發現，董監事會的職能在財務績效（ROA）數據顯示較不顯著，而市場績效（Tobin’s Q）數據顯示較為顯著。市場績效所反映的是投資者如何看待市場及體現企業在市場的情形，故董監事會職能之於整體的公司市場績效還是有其需求，例如可以反映在公司的股價上，然而能否確實地提高企業財務績效，我們從實證結果中瞭解，還是有些困難的。
另外，董監事會監督控制功能與資源提供功能的互補效果是具有正向但不顯著的關係，再經分組處理後，研究顯示相較於監督控制功能和資源提供功能都較弱或只有單一功能較強的企業，對於企業營運績效的差別並不大；只有將董監事會的監督控制功能與資源提供功能效果一起提昇，對於公司的營運績效才有提高的效果。

摘要(英)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between board competency and corporate performance. Furthermore, Discussing the two main function of the board (monitoring and resourcing), and how it impact to firm performance. Based on TEJ Taiwan’s board responsibilities and professionalism DB data, listing companies in Taiwan form 2010 to 2015 as sample. There are seven board competency: size of board, rate of outside board, multiple directorships of independent directors, meeting frequency, rate of board attendance, education level and professional experience, which by using regression analysis method
The result represents that board competency isn’t significant at financial performance (ROA), however, is significant in market performance (Tobin’s Q). As we know, Tobin’s Q shows stock price to investors, however we don’t sure board competency have impact on ROA.
The result also shows that only focus one of function, either monitoring or resourcing is not good enough to corporate, only if focus both monitoring and resourcing is good to corporate performance.

關鍵字(中)

★ 董監事會職能
★ 代理理論
★ 資源依賴理論
★ 企業績效

關鍵字(英)

★ Board Competency
★ Agency Theory
★ Resource Dependence Theory
★ Performance

論文目次

第一章緒論 1
第一節研究背景 1
第二節研究動機與目的 2
第三節研究流程 3
第二章文獻探討 4
第一節董監事會職能與企業績效之關聯 4
第二節董監事會監督控制功能與企業績效之關聯 6
第三節董監事會資源提供功能與企業績效之關聯 9
第四節董監事會的監督控制功能與資源提供功能關係 12
第三章研究方法 13
第一節研究架構 13
第二節樣本描述與研究變項 13
第三節統計方法 15
第四章研究結果分析 17
第一節敘述性統計分析 17
第二節迴歸分析 22
第五章結論與建議 29
第一節研究結論 29
第二節管理意涵 32
第三節研究限制 34
參考文獻 35

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指導教授

陳明園(Ming-Yuan Chen)

審核日期

2017-7-26

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