以雙邊平台模型分析雲端遊戲主機經營策略

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蔡名鎧(TSAI, MING-KAI) 查詢紙本館藏

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資訊管理學系

論文名稱

以雙邊平台模型分析雲端遊戲主機經營策略
(An Analysis of Operating Strategies for a Cloud Console Service in a Two-Sided Market)

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至系統瀏覽論文 (2026-7-20以後開放)

摘要(中)

在以往的雙邊平台賽局競爭中，鮮少以遊戲領域的廠商去討論，本論文以傳統主機平台與近期竄起的雲端主機平台做雙邊平台賽局競爭分析，而由於雲端主機平台需保持穩定的網路頻寬，因此本論文也將提供穩定網路頻寬的ISP業者納入考慮，並設計雲端主機平台與ISP業者在Multi-homing下的直接銷售、委外協商兩大模型，並模擬及比較模型中平台商們的競合關係，最後提出研究分析的成果。

本研究有數個發現，首先是在直接銷售模式下，虛擬機效能的增加，並不能直接增加雲端主機平台商的收益，而是要虛擬機效能高於一個門檻值，才會有顯著增加，接下來是關於ISP收費的議題，我們發現ISP向消費者增加收費時，反而須向雲端主機平台收取更低的費用，甚至收費高於某一個程度，要對雲端平台進行補貼。

而我們也對雲端主機平台及ISP組成的雲端聯盟進行了討論，在委外協商模式下，會投入更多資源給遊戲業者，因此ISP業者間接要負擔更多的遊戲開發商費用，而ISP給雲端主機平台的傭金會取決於他們的收益分享比例，最後我們一樣是對虛擬機效能作探討，我們發現虛擬機效能越好，最大的利潤收益者是ISP，而不是我們一般認知的雲端主機平台，隨著虛擬機效能的增加，ISP利潤成長幅度會遠超於雲端主機平台，而傳統主機平台利潤則會減少。

摘要(英)

In the past, there are few studies examining the competition between a traditional console provider and a cloud console provider in a two-sided market. In our study, we apply a two-sided model to analyze the profitability of a cloud console service. Particularly, because of stable bandwidth demanded by the cloud console service, we involve the role of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) in our model. For the cloud console platform and the ISP, we consider direct selling and delegation models in a Multi-homing setup, in which game developers can either choose exclusive provision or provide their games on the two platforms simultaneously. This consideration helps us elicit useful strategies and implications by simulating their partner relationship.

We have several interesting findings in this research. First, when the performance of virtual machine is enhanced in the direct selling model, it cannot assure a higher profit of the cloud console platform. The virtual machine will help the cloud console platform increase its profit when its performance is higher than a certain level. Next, we discuss the burden of Internet cost related to ISP and the cloud console platform. When gaining more from consumers, the ISP can charge the cloud console platform a lower network fee instead. When the network fee paid by consumers is high enough, the ISP even needs to subsidize the cloud console provider.

Second, we examine the close-knit alliance composed of the cloud console provider and ISP. In the delegation model, when the virtual machine can help save more hardware cost, the cloud console provider will pay game developers a higher license fee for expanding its game library. Meanwhile, the ISP will share more license fee of game developers as well. Then, the commission which the ISP gives to cloud console platform will be determined by their bargaining power. Finally, we further examine the profitability of each participant in the console market when the virtual machine technology is advanced. We find the advance of virtual machine technology can benefit the ISP rather than the cloud console provider, which is contrary to our intuition. More precisely, the profit of the ISP will increase more sharply than that of the cloud console provider; on the other hand, the profit of the traditional console platform will decline.

關鍵字(中)

★ 雙邊平台
★ 主機遊戲
★ 產品差異化
★ 直接銷售
★ 委外協商

關鍵字(英)

★ Versioning
★ Cloud Service Provider
★ First-Come First-Served
★ Priority Queues
★ Advertising
★ Personalization
★ Resource Utilization

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iv
壹、諸論 1
貳、文獻探討 3
一、Two-sided model 3
二、GaaS(Game as a service) 4
三、競爭性訂價和網路效應 4
四、產品差異化概念 5
五、委外協商銷售模式 6
六、串流遊戲產業的最新趨勢 6
參、模型 7
一、Multi-homing two side model 7
二、Multi-homing遊戲開發商 8
三、Multi -homing消費者 9
四、Multi-homing直接銷售模型 11
Proposition 1 13
Proposition 2 14
五、Multi-homing委外協商模型 15
Proposition 3 16
Observation 1 17
肆、結論 18
一、管理意涵 19
二、未來研究 20
三、附錄 21
附錄1：模型參數與決策變數 21
附錄2：模型均衡解 22
附錄3：Proposition證明 24
伍、參考文獻 26

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指導教授

張李治華(Jhih-Hua Jhang-Li)

審核日期

2021-7-20

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