蘋果手機應用程式商店之反競爭議題研究

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論文名稱

蘋果手機應用程式商店之反競爭議題研究
(Antitrust Issues of Apple App Store)

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摘要(中)

應用程式商店是消費者使用手機不可或缺之程式，其市場之競爭情形會影響眾多消費者利益，市場中廠商行為是否合乎競爭法亦是眾人關心之議題。
蘋果公司旗下智慧型手機應用程式商店為Apple App Store(AAS)，AAS是iOS作業系統中的應用程式交易、下載平台，同時向使用該系統的應用程式開發者、消費者提供服務。蘋果公司於AAS訂定了佣金制度、交易管道限制等眾多規定，然前述規定頗受爭議。舉例而言，近年有眾多開發者、消費者主張AAS的佣金制度不合理，收取了過高的價格，可能涉及超額定價行為，損害開發者、消費者權益。此外，亦有開發者主張AAS之交易管道限制規定不公平，使相同效率的開發者無法擁有相同的競爭優勢，可能涉及反競爭自我偏好、濫用市場地位等行為，損害害開發者權益及競爭秩序，部分開發者甚至因此提起訴訟。
綜上所述，討論蘋果公司為AAS訂定的佣金制度、交易管道限制等規定是否有害競爭、是否損害應用程式開發者、消費者權益應有其必要性。為達成前述目的，本文會先探討AAS之商業模式，評估AAS所屬市場之範圍、市場力量分佈。後參酌評估結果及數位平台相關競爭法規，分析蘋果公司為AAS訂定的規定是否有害競爭。
惟AAS等數位平台的業務拓展少受地域限制，假若平台廠商又擁有技術優勢，市場影響力將遠大於一般廠商，即便平台市占率有限亦有能力藉自身優勢為反競爭行為並獲取超額利益。此情況下，一般競爭法規未針對數位平台之特徵訂定特別規定，不一定能妥善規範平台廠商行為，如我國公平交易法即面臨此類疑慮。故本文討論AAS對開發者之規定是否有害競爭時，除參考一般競爭法規，亦應參考近年學界、實務界提出的數位平台相關競爭理論，例如守門人理論等。
據本文研究，AAS所屬市場為iOS應用程式商店市場，該市場包含所有在iOS作業系統運作的應用程式商店，蘋果公司是該市場獨占者。且蘋果公司控制AAS，AAS是進入iOS應用程式市場的門戶，故蘋果公司亦是該市場之守門人，所有於iOS作業系統運作的應用程式均屬於該市場。此外，觀察蘋果公司於AAS訂定的佣金政策、交易管道限制等各項規定，可發現部分規定對開發者並不公平，是具反競爭性的自我偏好型排他行為，而該公司制定反轉向條款之做法，則是一濫用市場地位行為。二行為分別有害於iOS應用程式市場、iOS應用程式商店市場的競爭秩序。
若欲避免市場競爭、消費者利益因前述行為受到損害，得斟酌數位平台之特徵，訂定專門規範平台的競爭法規。而廢除AAS反轉向條款、禁止限制特定廠商銷售策略、推動蘋果公司反競爭訴訟和解，則有助減緩蘋果公司行為對開發者、消費者權益之負面影響。

摘要(英)

When people use smartphones, the application store is an essential product. The competition about the relevant market of application store will affect the people′s interests. And what the application store enterprise did violates antitrust laws or not is an issue that everyone cares.
Apple app store (AAS) is the application store developed by Apple Inc. Compared with other enterprises, Apple Inc.′s behavior is quite controversial. Therefore, this study will analyze Apple Inc.′s business strategy in the relevant market that AAS belongs, and whether the exclusionary practices that Apple Inc. did is anti-competitive.
In order to achieve the purpose of this study, this study will discuss the business model of AAS, and then assess the market scope and the market power of the relevant market that AAS belongs. Finally, the study will analyze whether the exclusionary practices that Apple Inc. did through AAS is anti-competitive.
In the conclusion of this study, the self-preferencing practices about AAS′s commission policy and sales strategies is anti-competition. On the other hand, making anti-steering provisions is an act about abusing of monopolistic position. The self-preferencing practices and the act about abusing of monopolistic position are not conducive to the competition of the market of app distribution on iOS device and the market of iOS app.
To avoid above-mentioned antitrust acts damaging the competition and the people′s interests, it is important to making the laws about the antitrust acts that digital platforms enterprises do. And abolishing anti-steering provisions, prohibiting the self-preferencing practices about AAS′s sales strategies, and advancing the conciliation of Apple′s antitrust lawsuits will promote the interests of developers and consumers that use AAS.

關鍵字(中)

★ 應用程式商店
★ 蘋果公司
★ 售後市場
★ 數位市場法

關鍵字(英)

★ app store
★ Apple Inc.
★ after market
★ Digital Market Act

論文目次

目錄
摘要 i
Abstract iii
誌謝 v
目錄 VII
圖目錄 xi
表目錄 xiii
1 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景及動機 1
1.2 研究目的 3
1.3 研究架構 3
2 APPLE APP STORE商業模式 5
2.1 為開發者訂定交易管道限制與佣金制度 5
2.2 為消費者提供APPLE APP STORE免費服務 7
2.3 綜合討論 8
3 APPLE APP STORE市場範圍及市場力量分析 11
3.1 APPLE APP STORE市場界定 12
3.1.1 附加服務售後市場 13
3.1.2 Lock In理論 15
3.1.3 主後市場連動理論 18
3.1.4 不同應用程式商店之市場範圍 21
3.1.5 綜合討論 23
3.2 APPLE APP STORE之市場力量分析 23
3.2.1 競爭優勢與市場現況 24
3.2.2 守門人理論 25
3.2.3 結論 28
4 APPLE APP STORE相關反競爭行為爭議 29
4.1 拒絕交易 29
4.1.1 反競爭性判定方法 30
4.1.2 反競爭性判定 31
4.1.2.1 無區別拒絕交易 31
4.1.2.1.1 關鍵設施理論 32
4.1.2.1.1.1 美國實務 33
4.1.2.1.1.2 歐盟實務 35
4.1.2.1.1.3 綜合討論 36
4.1.2.1.2 守門人理論 37
4.1.2.1.3 反對觀點與本文回應 39
4.1.2.1.4 結論 40
4.2 超額定價 40
4.2.1 反競爭性判定方法 41
4.2.1.1 美國實務 41
4.2.1.2 歐盟實務 42
4.2.1.3 我國實務 43
4.2.2 反競爭性判定 45
4.2.2.1 不同平台佣金比較與本文見解 49
4.2.2.2 AAS佣金比例過高之觀點與本文回應 50
4.2.2.3 結論 51
4.3 自我偏好 51
4.3.1 反競爭性判定方法 52
4.3.2 反競爭性判定 54
4.3.2.1 自我偏好動機 55
4.3.2.1.1 蘋果公司觀點與本文回應 55
4.3.2.1.2 殺戮區理論 56
4.3.2.1.3 結論 58
4.3.2.2 自我偏好做法 59
4.3.2.2.1 佣金政策 59
4.3.2.2.1.1 佣金自我偏好做法不具反競爭性之觀點與本文回應 61
4.3.2.2.1.2 結論 63
4.3.2.2.2 銷售限制 63
4.3.2.2.2.1 銷售策略自我偏好做法不具反競爭性之觀點與本文回應 64
4.3.2.2.2.2Google Search案 65
4.3.2.2.2.3 結論 66
4.4 濫用市場地位 67
4.4.1 反競爭性判定方法 67
4.4.2 反競爭性判定 68
4.4.2.1 反轉向條款 68
4.4.2.1.1 執行反轉向條款非濫用市場地位之觀點與本文回應 71
4.4.2.1.2 Ohio v. American Express Co. 71
4.4.2.1.3 結論 73
4.5 綜合討論 73
5 APPLE APP STORE相關反競爭行為管制建議 75
5.1 反競爭行為管制建議 75
5.1.1 美國、歐盟相關競爭管制現況 76
5.1.2 我國相關競爭管制建議 77
5.1.3 綜合討論 78
5.2 反競爭行為管制方法 79
5.2.1 廢除反轉向條款 79
5.2.2 停止銷售策略方面之自我偏好做法 79
5.2.3 其他促進競爭方法 80
5.3 結論 83
參考文獻 85

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指導教授

王明禮(Ming-Li Wang)

審核日期

2023-2-1

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