LWSS: 抵禦對控制器區域網路攻擊的輕量級系統

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姓名

張凱威(Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

資訊工程學系

論文名稱

LWSS: 抵禦對控制器區域網路攻擊的輕量級系統
(LWSS: A Lightweight System to Defeat Attacks on Controller Area Network)

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[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

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至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

車聯網及自動駕駛車是未來的趨勢，相關的技術也在蓬勃發展，
目的是幫助免於交通意外事故及方便通訊。然而，技術的發展可以解
決問題，但也產生一些安全性問題。其中之一的問題是惡意的電子控
制單元(ECU)可能讓車子發生不可預期的災難，導致關鍵設備無法正
常使用，稱為阻斷服務攻擊；或是惡意的ECU監聽車上訊息，透過車
聯網外洩，導致駭客攻擊；或是惡意的ECU假意送出惡意訊息，讓行
車缺乏安全。
本研究提出一個輕量級的監測系統-LWSS，在不需修改通訊協
定，或影響原有運作下，透過車用控制器網路(Controller Area Network, CAN Bus)訊息傳送過程中，建立監測系統來偵測可能惡意
的ECU攻擊，並即時通知自動駕駛機制，轉成手動駕駛模式，確保行
車安全，期能達到防止惡意攻擊、控制汽車的目的。

摘要(英)

Telematics and self-driving vehicles are the future, and related technologies are flourishing to help prevent traffic accidents and facilitate
communication. However, the development of technology can solve the
problem, but also produce some safety issues. One of these problems
is that a malicious electronic control unit (ECU) can cause an unpredictable disaster in a vehicle, resulting in the failure of critical equipment, called a Denial of Service (DoS) attack; or a malicious ECU can
listen to messages in the vehicle and leak them through the vehicle network, leading to a hacking attack; or a malicious ECU can send malicious
messages under false pretenses, making the vehicle unsafe to drive.
Our research proposes a lightweight monitoring system - LWSS,
which does not need to modify the communication protocol or affect the
original operation, and establish a monitoring system to detect possible malicious ECU attacks during the transmission of messages through
the Controller Area Network (CAN Bus), and immediately notify the
automatic driving mechanism to switch to manual driving mode to ensure the safety of driving, which can achieve the purpose of preventing
malicious attacks and controlling the vehicle.

關鍵字(中)

★ 控制器區域網路
★ 電子控制單元
★ 入侵偵測系統
★ 阻斷服務攻擊

關鍵字(英)

★ Controller Area Network(CAN)
★ Electronic Control Unit(ECU)
★ Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS)
★ Denial of Service(DoS)

論文目次

Contents
摘要 .................................................................................................... i
Abstract.............................................................................................. ii
謝誌 .................................................................................................... iii
Contents ............................................................................................. iv
List of Figures..................................................................................... vi
List of Tables......................................................................................viii
1 Introduction ......................................................................... 1
2 Background .......................................................................... 7
2.1 ECU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 CAN Bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 CAN Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Frame types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.3 Error Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.4 Error handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 OBD-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 PCAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 SocketCAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Related Work ....................................................................... 18
4 Research Content and Methodology..................................... 21
4.1 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.1 Intrusion alarm principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1.2 CAN Bus Wiring Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Proposed Solution-LWSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5 Evaluation ............................................................................ 33
5.1 Experimental Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2 Detection Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.2.1 Detect Malicious ECU content attack . . . . . . . . . 35
iv
5.2.2 Detect Malicious ECU ID attack . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.3 Detect DoS attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2.4 Detection ability of LWSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Discussions ........................................................................... 40
6.1 Evaluation Shortcomings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.3 Protection mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Conclusion............................................................................ 45
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
References........................................................................................... 55

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指導教授

許富皓

審核日期

2023-1-18

推文