| 摘要(英) |
Following the amendment of the "Renewable Energy Development Act," large electricity consumers are required to use a certain proportion of green electricity. However, it′s not just large consumers who need to purchase green electricity; many international chain brands have also responded to RE100 (Renewable Energy Initiative), committing to use 100% green electricity by 2025. To collaborate with these international corporations, businesses must actively purchase green electricity. However, the insufficient supply of green electricity has been an ongoing challenge for businesses.
Recognizing this business opportunity, a new role called the aggregator has emerged. Aggregators attempt to bridge the gap between renewable energy suppliers and businesses. By integrating resources from multiple parties, they provide the green electricity needed by businesses, thereby promoting the use of renewable energy and achieving profitability. This role not only helps businesses meet their environmental goals but also drives the development of the green electricity market, helping to solve the problem of businesses being unable to purchase green electricity.
In this article, we attempt to discuss the characteristics of unstable green electricity supply, which aligns with real-world conditions. The production of green electricity involves many factors, with weather being the most obvious. In this situation, aggregators bear the risk of potential supply shortages under business demands. Therefore, the research aim of this article is to explore how aggregators can reduce the risk of supply shortages through good contract design and increase the benefits for members of the supply chain.
Finally, as the demand for green electricity continues to grow, the role of aggregators becomes increasingly important. By integrating resources and optimizing the supply chain, they attempt to solve the problem of businesses obtaining green electricity while also promoting the development of the renewable energy market. This research is significant for addressing the future instability of green electricity supply.
Keywords: production capacity decision-making, green supply chain, incentive contract design |
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