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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/11009


    Title: 產銷通路協調之合約政策;Contract-Based Policies in Manufacturer - Retailer Channel
    Authors: 吳曉芬;Hsiao-Fen Wu
    Contributors: 工業管理研究所
    Keywords: 時尚性商品;賽局理論;fashion goods;Stackelberg
    Date: 2003-06-20
    Issue Date: 2009-09-22 14:12:00 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學圖書館
    Abstract: 時尚性商品的銷售具有高度需求不確定、銷售季短且有時效性、製造前置時間長等特質。在這樣的情況之下,往往製造商為了節省成本以及刺激零售商的訂購量,普遍採行退貨或其他機制以達到通路整合?然而真正面對需求不確定性的是零售商,零售商的行為決策視為製造商採行各種政策與基製的重要考量。本研究方向主要應用Stackelberg 賽局理論為架構,考量製造商最佳的批發價定價策略與退貨機制達到通路整合與雙贏的機制?考量製造商定價與零售商訂購策略, 擬訂一最佳的合約政策,而製造者與零售商雙方亦可透過此合約政策或得更好的利潤,達到通路整合。 Fashion goods industries are characterized with a short selling season, uncertainty demand and long manufacturing lead times. The manufacturer usually constructs a contract of quantity discount and returns policy to encourage the retailer to stock more aggressively. This paper utilizes the single period inventory model under four pricing policies that include a basic policy without returns and quantity discount, a returns policy, a quantity discount policy and a combination policy of returns and quantity discount. We compare these four decisions in manufacturer-retailer channel for fashion goods and show that the policy with both quantity discount and returns policy can induce the retailer to order more products. Our objective is to provide a win-win coordination mechanism of contract-based policies between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under demand uncertainty, a good contract can encourage appropriate coordination. If the mechanism can guarantee channel coordination but can’t assure win-win, then the contract will not be acceptable, because it may hurt one of the parties in the supply chain channel.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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